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     FROM CONTRACT TO STATUS: COLLABORATION AND THE 
EVOLUTION OF NOVEL FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS

 
Elizabeth S. Scott
*
 & Robert E. Scott
**
 
 
The past decade has witnessed dramatic changes in public attitudes and legal status for 
same-sex couples who wish to marry.  These changes demonstrate that the legal conception of 
the family is no longer limited to traditional marriage. They also raise the possibility that other 
relationships—cohabiting couples and their children, voluntary kin groups, multigenerational 
groups and polygamists—might gain legal recognition as families. This Article probes the 
challenges faced by aspiring families and the means by which they could attain their goal. It 
builds on the premise that the state remains committed to social welfare criteria for granting 
family status, recognizing as families only those categories of relationships that embody a long-
term commitment to mutual care and interdependence and, on that basis, function well to satisfy 
members’ dependency needs. Groups aspiring to legal recognition as families must overcome 
substantial uncertainties as to whether they meet these criteria if they are to obtain the rights 
and obligations of legally recognized families. Uncertainty contributes to a lack of confidence in 
the durability and effectiveness of novel relationships on the part of the aspiring family members 
themselves, the larger social community and, ultimately, the state. We develop an informal model 
to illustrate the nature of these uncertainties, as well as the solutions to the possible obstacles 
they create. Using a hypothetical group consisting of two adult men and two adult women in a 
polyamorous relationship, we show how legal family status for novel groups can result from an 
evolutionary process for overcoming uncertainties that uses collaborative techniques to build 
trust and confidence. Collaborative processes have been shown in other settings to be effective 
mechanisms for creating trust incrementally and thus appear to offer a way forward for novel 
families.  We show that the successful movement to achieve marriage rights for LBGT couples 
has roughly conformed to the collaborative processes we propose, and the absence of 
meaningful collaboration is one factor explaining the stasis that characterizes the status of 
unmarried cohabitants.  This evidence supports the prediction that the future progress of other 
aspiring family groups toward attaining legal status may depend on how well they are able to 
engage the collaborative mechanisms that smooth the path from contract to status. 
 
 
                                                     

 The title, draws on (and challenges) Henry Maine’s famous statement that “the movement of progressive societies 
has…been a movement from Status to Contract.” HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 174 (J. Murray, 10th Ed) 
See Brian Bix, Private Ordering in Family Law, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. 249, n. 30 (discussing domestic relations 
context of Maine’s statement). 
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 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2483430 
 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Many contemporary scholars and policy advocates challenge the privileged status of 
marriage, arguing that the state should recognize and support other family relationships.
1
  
Historically, this challenge has been based on a feminist critique of marriage as a patriarchal 
institution that oppresses women.  But the trend toward greater gender equality in the formal 
status of husbands and wives has led recently to a more generalized claim that the elevated status 
of marriage demeans and unfairly disadvantages other families.
2
  These arguments have been 
influential in the successful movement toward recognition of the marriage rights of same-sex 
couples.  They apply as well to the (as yet unsatisfied) demands by scholars and advocates that 
other family categories based on adult relationships
3
 – cohabiting couples and their children, 
voluntary kin groups,
4
 polygamists, and multi-generational family groups raising children— 
deserve the legal recognition enjoyed by married couples.
5
 
  The view that heterosexual marriage should be an exclusive legal status was grounded 
traditionally in conventional moral and religious norms.  Cohabiting, polygamous and same-sex 
                                                     
1
  Often critics argue for the abolition of legal marriage. See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE 
SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1996) (challenging the privileged status of marriage 
and arguing that marital privilege should be transferred to families based on caretaker and dependent); NANCY 
POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008) (arguing that 
privileging marriage harms other families); JUDITH STACEY, UNHITCHED: LOVE, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY VALUES 
FROM WEST HOLLYWOOD TO WESTERN CHINA (2011)(arguing that marriage should be abolished and a diverse range 
of families recognized because marriage is declining and family diversity dominates ). See also Mark Goldfeder, It’s 
Time to Reconsider Polygamy, CNN Opinion, 12\16\2013 at http://cnn.com/2013/12/16/opinion/goldfeder-
polygamy-laws (advocating legalization). A Canadian commission argued for legal protection of a broad range of 
families. Law Commission of Canada, Beyond Conjugality ; Recognizing and Supporting Close Personal Adult 
Relationships (2001).  
2
 Suzanne Goldberg, Why Marriage?, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TWENTI-
FIRST CENTURY FAMILIES 224 (M. GARRISON & E. SCOTT, EDS. 2012) (arguing that the argument against marriage as 
a privileged legal status has shifted to one focused on the harm to non-marital families; Judith Stacey, supra note 1 at 
8-15. (advocating diversity and challenging feminist opposition to polygamy).  
3
 We assume that a parent raising a child alone constitutes a family that warrants societal support and resources, but 
our focus is on families based on adult relationships:  For our purposes, “families” are relationships that warrant a 
special legal status based on their perceived social value in satisfying dependency needs. See text accompanying 
notes _ to _ infra.The qualities of family relationships is discussed in Part I infra at _ 
4
 Voluntary kin groups are often described as families of choice; family relationships developed by parties without 
blood or legal ties, Dawn Braithwaite, et al., Constructing Family: A Typology of Voluntary Kin, 27 (3) J. Soc. & 
Pers. Rel. 388 (2010)(describing types and functions of voluntary kin relationships). See discussion in Part IIIC2 
infra. 
5
 See note 1 supra.  
 3 
unions were considered illicit and therefore undeserving of legal protection.
6
  As contemporary 
moral norms have evolved, however, the historic justification for this exclusive legal status has 
weakened.  Recent surveys by the Pew Foundation and other polling organizations show growing 
public acceptance of cohabitation relationships as well as same-sex unions.
7
  Some observers 
suggest that even polygamous relationships are becoming “normalized,” pointing to the 
popularity of the television series’ Big Love and Sister Wives.8 Although social acceptance of a 
broader range of intimate relationships need not result in their recognition by the state as legal 
families, it is clear that religious and moral sanctioning of non-traditional families has 
diminished, lowering a barrier to societal recognition of novel family groups.  
The transformation in social attitudes creates the possibility of a legal regime that fosters 
pluralism, allowing individuals to pursue their own vision of the good life in forming family 
relationships.  On this view, fundamental notions of autonomy and fairness support the claim that 
the liberal state should offer individuals the freedom to undertake whatever family relationships 
maximize their utility and then should support those families equally.
9
 From a social welfare 
perspective, however, personal satisfaction is not the sole basis for conferring family status.
10
 
Families serve the critically important functions of raising children, caring for elderly persons 
and otherwise satisfying society’s dependency needs. Only relationships that fulfill those 
functions adequately are likely to attain legal status as families. But a puzzle that remains: Why, 
in an era of social tolerance, have novel family categories,
11
 with the exception of gays and 
                                                     
6
 See discussion of this trend in Marvin v Marvin, 557 P2d. 106 (Cal. 1976)(holding contracts between cohabitants 
enforceable).  See also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)(striking down criminal sodomy law). However, 
moral norms against illicit sexual relationships do not explain why non-conjugal relationships failed to qualify as 
family relationships. See discussion in Part IIIC2, infra at ---. 
7
 Pew Research Center, The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families, at 1. 
http://www.pewresearch.org/pubs/1802/decline-marriage-rise-new-families (hereinafter The Decline of Marriage). 
8
  Goldfeder, supra note 1. Adrienne Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules and Bargaining for 
Equality, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (2010) (suggesting how regulation based on a partnership model could 
normalize polygamous relationships).  Big Love, which ran for 5 seasons from 2006-201, was nominated for Emmy 
and Golden Globe awards.  http://www.hbo.com/big-love#/big-love/about/index.html. See discussion of polygamy 
in Part IIIC1, infra. 
9
  The autonomy norm suggests, for example, that the state might provide a menu of family forms from which 
individuals could choose the option best suited to their needs. Shahar Lifschitz, Married Against their Will? Toward 
a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1535 (2010)(arguing for family pluralism 
as an intrinsic value and challenging the imposition of mandatory obligations on cohabitants)(discussing the intrinsic 
value of pluralism as allowing individuals to make life choices ); William Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The 
Guided Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules and Override Rules, 100 Geo. L.J. 1881 (2012). 
10
 See discussion in Part I infra at _. 
11
 Our analysis of the path to legal recognition focuses on novel family categories (not individual novel families) 
primarily because we predict this is the course regulators are likely to take. As with marriage, once a category is 
 4 
lesbians seeking marriage rights, failed to attain legal recognition?  The answer to this question 
turns on the effects of substantial uncertainties that impede the pathway to legal status for novel 
family forms.  
This Article develops an informal model to illustrate those uncertainties as well as 
solutions to the possible obstacles they create. The uncertainties begin with questions the parties 
themselves will have about the viability of their novel relationship, but also including public 
ambivalence and the skepticism of lawmakers about the quality of the novel group’s 
relationships. The discrete challenges facing an aspiring family are a function of three conditions 
that we label novelty, social isolation and non-verifiability. We describe a hypothetical group 
consisting of two adult men and two adult women in a polyamorous relationship who are initially 
uncertain whether their family form can succeed in maintaining a long-term commitment to 
mutual care, interdependency and formal equality.  In addition, even as a few such successful 
families evolve, at first they are likely to be socially isolated, lacking the necessary affiliations 
with each other to form a mutually supportive normative community and to pursue their goals of 
public acceptance and legal recognition. Finally, our aspiring families face regulatory 
uncertainty: the state will lack the information needed to verify the acceptable functioning of the 
novel class as a precondition to licensing individual families.  
 Uncertainty in each of these dimensions contributes to a lack of confidence in the 
durability and effectiveness of novel relationships to adequately fulfill family functions on the 
part of the aspiring family members themselves, the larger social community and, ultimately, the 
state. Yet, high levels of uncertainty have been resolved successfully in other contexts through a 
process of collaboration in which trust in the relationship and confidence in a successful outcome 
develops incrementally. This raises the question whether collaborative processes can also address 
the conditions that impede the legal recognition of aspiring families.  Here we draw on 
successful collaborations in commercial settings to describe in a stylized manner an 
evolutionary, multi-stage process through which the novel group can obtain the rights and 
obligations of legally recognized families.
12
 Initially, by forming collaborative agreements, the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
recognized, individuals seeking to register their relationships may be subject to administrative requirements, but not 
to inquiry about whether their relationship satisfies the criteria discussed in the text.    
12
 The stages are presented as distinct but, as we discuss in Part IIIA, they are likely to overlap substantially. 
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parties can build trust and confidence in both the quality and durability of their relationships.
13
 
Further, by affiliating in networks, isolated novel families can build a normative community that 
can provide support, facilitate social awareness and acceptance, and overcome political obstacles 
to attaining their legal objective.
14
 Finally, through an iterative process, the state can develop 
confidence in the capacities of the novel family category to fulfill family functions.
15
  
The model sheds light on both the success and failure of two contemporary aspiring 
family groups in securing legal protection for their relationships.  First, it illuminates the process 
through which same-sex couples have attained marriage rights.
16
  We show how these couples 
seeking official recognition of their families faced the uncertainties we describe and argue that 
the movement toward marriage equality has roughly tracked the evolutionary process we model.  
In the early period, despite public opprobrium, same-sex couples entered committed 
relationships, that were often maintained secretly.
17
 But the AIDS crisis and the lesbian baby 
boom clarified the vulnerability of these family relationships,
18
 spurring the formation of a 
powerful normative community and a network of advocacy groups aimed at gaining public 
acceptance and legal protection.
19
  Legal recognition of family status has then proceeded through 
an iterative process as regulators and the public have gained confidence in the quality of 
committed same-sex relationships.  Second, the model suggests why cohabitation relationships 
as a class have failed to attain protected family status.
20
  Here the sorting problem is acute 
because cohabiting couples are a heterogeneous category with diverse goals and expectations for 
                                                     
13
 See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal 
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1377, 1405–10 (2010) and discussion in Part 
IIB(2) infra.  
14
 See Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy:  Network Forms of Organization, 12 Res. Org. Beh. 2905 
(1990) and discussion in Part IIB (3) infra. 
15
 See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contract and Innovation:  The Limited Role of 
Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 170 (2013) and discussion in 
Part IIB (4) infra. 
16
 See discussion in Part IIIA infra. 
17
 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Democracy, Kulturkampf, and the Apartheid of the Closet, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 419, 441 
(1997). 
18
 GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY'S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY 96–111 
(2004) (arguing for significance of HIV/AIDS and assisted reproductive technology as key factors in push for same-
sex marriage). 
19
 This movement included an effective strategy of signaling to the broader society the marriage-like nature of the 
gay and lesbian affiliations. See discussion in Part IIIA infra.  
20
 See discussion in Part IIIB infra. Cohabitants have struggled to establish claims for support and property rights 
despite law reform efforts. See Marvin, supra note 5; ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, 
Domestic Partners, 907-944 (2000)(creating and enforcing financial obligations between unmarried cohabitants).   
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their relationships. This heterogeneity, together with the defining decision not to marry, impedes 
the creation of networks and sends a confusing signal about the nature of cohabiting unions.
21
  
Moreover, the state has not found an effective means of distinguishing those cohabiting partners 
who are committed to assuming long term family obligations from others who are not.  
Finally, the model predicts the course (though not the success) of other novel families 
seeking legal recognition. Individuals in polyamorous, multigenerational, and voluntary kin 
groups may perform family functions and aspire to the legal status of established families.
22
 In 
our society, these groups are truly novel in the sense that they are not dyadic unions modeled on 
marriage.  They face the uncertainties of novelty, isolation and non-verifiability to varying 
degrees and, in order to succeed, each group must overcome its own set of challenges. For 
example, like same-sex couples, polyamorous groups are likely to confront public hostility, but 
they also face the challenge of creating and enforcing understandings among multiple parties 
sufficient to sustain well-functioning families. Voluntary kin groups are diverse and face the 
challenges created by heterogeneity.  In each case, the model suggests the impediments to legal 
recognition and how they might overcome through the various collaborative processes we 
describe.  
At the outset, it may be helpful to make a few clarifying points. Our approach to the issues 
we address in the Article is primarily descriptive and predictive, rather than normative. We 
recognize that American law places primary responsibility for satisfying dependency needs on 
private families and assume that this “neo-liberal” approach is likely to continue.23  On our view, 
the assumption of greater responsibility for dependency by the state would enhance social 
welfare, but the Article does not directly address this important policy issue.  We also assume 
that families based on marriage likely will continue to enjoy broad public support and a 
privileged legal status, and to be viewed as embodying qualities associated with satisfactory 
                                                     
21
 Some cohabitants are in marriage-like unions while others cohabit specifically to avoid family obligations. See 
discussion in Part IIIB infra. 
22
 See discussion in Part IIIC infra. 
23
 Anne Alstott, Neo-Liberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and Laissez Faire Markets in the Minimal 
State, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2459972 , June 2014 (challenging this approach); See 
generally MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004) (arguing for collective 
responsibility for dependency); MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES , GOVERNMENT AND 
AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS (2010)(arguing that modern liberal theory discounts families and offers too narrow a 
conception of the government’s responsibility for dependency).  
 7 
family functioning. Our goal is to explore under what conditions and through what mechanisms 
other family categories that embody those qualities could attain a similar status.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes demographic changes in American 
families and in public attitudes over the past half century that have created the possibility that 
other family forms could be accorded the legal status and resources that marriage enjoys. After 
describing the useful social functions of families, we argue that marriage is likely to continue to 
qualify for special treatment, but that other groups successfully performing family functions can  
also aspire to similar recognition. 
Part II develops an informal model that describes predictable obstacles to legal 
recognition and a multi-stage collaborative process by which a hypothetical aspiring family 
might overcome these obstacles. Successful collaborations mature into contracts for mutual care 
and support with enforceable obligations that define relationships in terms of the maintenance of 
family functions.  As these commitments become widely observable, a collaborative network 
forms among aspiring families: A set of emerging social norms reinforces the stability of those 
relationships and the families and their leaders signal the quality of their relationships to the 
larger society, increasing awareness and acceptance.  Ultimately, the state verifies that family 
functions are performed adequately and extends formal recognition through a collaborative 
process that certifies the novel family category.  
In Part III, we first show that the still-evolving process that has led a growing number of 
states to grant marriage rights to gays and lesbians is consistent with the predictions of the 
collaborative approach. We then turn to cohabitation and explain how the model developed in 
Part II sheds light on the failure of cohabitants to gain substantial legal protection. Finally, we 
examine the unique uncertainties facing other novel families including polygamous and 
voluntary kin relationships, and briefly address the question of legal recognition for groups 
assuming more limited family obligations. We conclude that collaborative processes designed to 
build confidence and trust between the family members and with others (including the state) 
offers these and other aspiring families the means to resolve uncertainty and ultimately attain 
legal recognition.  
 
 8 
I.  MARRIAGE AND THE SPECIAL LEGAL STATUS OF FAMILIES 
 As the public has increasingly come to accept non-marital families, the claim of marriage 
critics that the law should recognize and support a broader range of families has become more 
compelling.  In this Part, we briefly sketch these social changes, and then explore the key social 
functions of families and the qualities of relationships that perform these functions well and are 
likely to qualify for legal recognition. We examine privileges, benefits and obligations that 
currently are assigned to marriage, and predict that, although many contemporary marriages fall 
short, marriage as a category is likely to continue to provide the template for well-functioning 
families for the public and lawmakers alike.  Our analysis also leads us to conclude that other 
relationship categories that function satisfactorily to fulfill family functions qualify to receive the 
same level of support and societal resources. 
A.  FAMILY CHANGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL ATTITUDES 
The question that our article addresses-- under what conditions and through what means 
might the law recognize novel families-- is the subject of serious discussion only because of 
dramatic changes in family demographics and social attitudes over the past half century.  Until 
the 1960s, both the law and entrenched social norms prescribed heterosexual marriage defined by 
ascribed gender roles as the only acceptable family form.
24
 Much has changed since that time.  
To begin, the proportion of families based on marriage has declined. A recent Pew survey found 
that barely 50% of American adults were married, the lowest rate ever reported.
25
 Meanwhile, 
the percentage of couples living together in non-marital unions has increased steadily, as have 
the number of children born to unmarried mothers, often cohabiting (at birth) with their 
children’s fathers.26 As a result of the increase in non-marital families and their relative 
instability (and also higher divorce rates among married couples), more children live in families 
that include their mothers, new partners and step and half siblings. Gay and lesbian couples also 
                                                     
24
 See generally Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth Scott. Legal Regulation of Twenty-First Century Families, in 
GARRISON AND SCOTT, MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 2 at 303.  
25
 Pew Research Center, Barely Half of U.S. Adults are Married-A New Low (2011), at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/12/14/barely-half-of-us-adults-are-married-arecord-low/?src=prc-headline. 
26
 The most comprehensive research on children in unmarried families is the ongoing longitudinal Fragile Families 
Study, conducted by Sara McLanahan and her colleagues.  See e.g. Sara McLanahan and Christine Percheski, 
Family Structure and the Reproduction of Inequality, 34 Annual Rev. Sociology 257 (2008) (reporting 50% of non-
marital parents living together at child’s birth);  Sara McLanahan and Irwin Garfinkel, Fragile Families: Debates, 
Facts and Solutions, IN GARRISON AND SCOTT, MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, at 151.  
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live together and raise children in a way that was uncommon fifty years ago.  And as the 
traditional nuclear family has become less prevalent, multi-generational groups in which 
grandparents assist with childcare and adult children care for their parents have taken on new 
importance.
27
  Less often highlighted but also a part of the picture of family diversity in the early 
21
st
 century are other non-conjugal families made up of relatives or groups of unrelated adults, 
sometimes called voluntary kin.
28
 
The factors contributing to these demographic changes have been much discussed and are 
not of central importance to our analysis.
29
 What is important is the generally tolerant public 
response to these social developments. Recent polls indicate that most adults in this country have 
positive or at least neutral views about a broad range of families, expressing accepting attitudes 
toward non-marital couples with (and without) children and same sex couples.
30
 In many states, a 
majority of citizens endorse same-sex marriage.
31
 Younger adults are more accepting of non-
marital families than their elders,
32
 suggesting that attitudes may become increasingly tolerant 
over time. In a 2010 poll, only unmarried women having children without a partner met with 
respondents’ disapproval.33 
This account oversimplifies somewhat how the public views novel intimate relationships.  
To be sure, tolerance does not extend to all relationships.  Polygamy, for example, continues to 
be subject to public censure; fundamentalist Mormons and other religious-based groups 
practicing polygamy have generally been viewed as pathological, arousing public alarm about 
                                                     
27
 The Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of grandparents in children’s lives. Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57 (2000)(holding that parents’ objection to grandparent visitation must be given substantial weight, but 
declining to hold grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional). 
28
  For a general discussion of the diversity of modern American families, see Natalie Angier, The Changing 
American Family, N.Y.Times, 11/26/2013 at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/26/health/families.html?_r=0 t.  See 
also Braithwaite, et.al., supra note 4_(study of voluntary kin).  
29
 See discussion in Angier, id. Contributing factors to family change include the sexual revolution, availability of 
birth control, the decline in religious observance, the women’s equality movement, etc.   
30
 Pew, The Decline of Marriage, supra note ---.   
31
 Pew Research Center, Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage, March 12, 2014, at 4. 
http://www.pewforum.org/topics/gay-marriage-and-homosexuality.  A large minority of states recognize same sex 
marriage (hereinafter Changing Attitudes). See National Center of State Legislatures, Defending Marriage: State 
Defense of Marriage Laws and Same Sex Marriage at http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-
marriage-overview.aspx#.  
32
 Pew, Changing Attitudes, id. at 6.  
33
 Pew, The Decline of Marriage, supra note ---. 
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the sexual coercion of young girls.
34
  Certainly less controversial, but also less familiar, are non-
conjugal voluntary kin groups, which thus far have attracted little public or political attention.
35
 
Nonetheless, the recent demographic changes, together with more accepting public attitudes 
toward a range of families, raise the possibility that other groups besides married couples might 
gain legal recognition as families.  
B. THE QUALITIES OF WELL-FUNCTIONING FAMILIES  
Given that our project is to explore whether novel family categories might attain legal 
recognition, we must answer a threshold question: Why are families so special and what are the 
qualities of adult relationships that are likely to function adequately as families?  
We start with the observation that in contemporary society, a broad public consensus 
supports the proposition that (at least some) family relationships have substantial social value 
and should enjoy a special legal status.  The reasons for this consensus are straightforward. As 
many scholars have noted, families do the important work of satisfying society’s dependency 
needs.
36
  Families care for dependent children, prepare them for citizenship and educate them to 
be productive members of society.
37
  Families also assume responsibility for responding to 
members’ physical and emotional needs created by illnesses, disabilities, old age and the 
ordinary stresses of life.
38
  Not every family provides necessary or adequate care to its dependent 
members, of course, but collectively families perform an extraordinarily valuable social function. 
The state assists families in performing these functions by providing key services and financial 
                                                     
34
 A recent Gallup poll found that 86% found polygamy to be morally wrong.  Frank Newport and Igor Himelfarb, 
In U.S., Record High Say Gay, Lesbian Relations Morally Okay, Gallup Politics at 2. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/162689/record-high-say-gay-lesbian-relations-morally.aspx. Elizabeth Emens describes 
the hostility to polygamy generated by opponents to gay marriage, Elizabeth Emens, Monogamy’s Law, Compulsory 
Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U Rev. L. & Soc. Change 277, 277-284 (2004-05) (hereinafter 
Monogamy’s Law). For discussion of public attitudes toward polygamy, see text accompanying notes – to -- infra. 
35
 Scholars and law reform groups have shown some interest. See Law Commission of Canada, supra note 1. See 
also text accompanying notes – to – infra.  
36
 See FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 1. 
37
 See Elizabeth Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children’s Welfare, 11 Wm & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 1071 (2003).  In 
an earlier article, we described the valuable societal service parents provide and argued that autonomy and state 
support of parenting is a quid pro quo for parents’ assuming responsibilities for raising and educating their 
children—functions that would otherwise be borne collectively. See Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, Parents as 
Fiduciaries 81 V. L. Rev. 2401(1995). See also Linda McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, 
Resources and Republicanism, 76 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1673, 1677 (2001).  
38
 FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH, supra note 24 at 15-19.  In some families, of course, adult members may 
undertake specialized roles in performing these functions, with some performing direct caretaking services and 
others providing financial resources that indirectly support caretaking. 
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subsidies,
39
 by recognizing intimate family bonds, and by defining family rights and 
obligations.
40
 Family members performing their roles responsibly save societal resources that 
otherwise would be expended in providing adequate care for children and for elderly and 
disabled persons.
41
  Even if the state were to assume a far greater responsibility for satisfying 
society’s dependency needs as many reformers have advocated, families would continue to play 
a critical role.
42
 
Many individuals and groups may assume the burden of caring for others, but not all will 
attain legal recognition as families.  Biological relationship is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for protected legal status.
43
 The nephew who resides with his aunt and uncle while 
attending college and assists with babysitting is not in a “family” relationship that is 
acknowledged by law—though his co-residents are.44 What then are the qualities that identify 
adult affiliations as family relationships? On our view, a contemporary family that is based on 
adult relationships embodies several key attributes: a demonstrated commitment to a long-term 
emotionally intimate affiliation in which the parties usually live together in a relationship of 
relative equality, the assumption of responsibility for mutual care (and the care of children or 
other dependent family members), financial interdependence, and the understanding that 
members’ welfare is prioritized above that of others.45 Family bonds are built on trust that 
enables each member to rely on others to fulfill their roles and to “be there” in good times and 
                                                     
39
 Government services that assist families in raising children and caring for dependency includes free public 
schools, subsidized day care, TANF subsidies, nutrition programs, Medicaid and social security spousal and 
survivor benefits.  See CURRIE, supra note _ (discussing safety net programs). See also CLARE HUNTINGTON, 
FLOURISHING FAMILIES: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014)(critiquing current policy as 
inadequate and proposing how law could fully support families).] 
40
 The state recognizes family bonds in guardianship law, in the duty to rescue children and spouses and in laws 
governing intestacy. Divorce regulation of property division and support define financial spousal obligations. See 
note -- supra.  
41
 FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 1 (arguing that the government should support and compensate 
families for their critical role in caring for dependency needs) ;  FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER as Fiduciaries, 
supra note – at -; (describing quid pro quo); see also, Collins, Leib and Markel, supra note - at 1355-56 (describing 
how special legal protections of families are compensation for the services families provide, thereby relieving the 
state of their cost).   
42
 Text accompanying note _supra.  
43
 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)(upholding statute denying parental rights unmarried biological 
father of child born to married couple).   
44
 Similarly three young adult cousins likely  would not be eligible to rent a house zoned for “single-family” 
residences.   
45
 Some of these traits might be contested  but we think our description is consistent with conventional 
understandings. Courts evaluating whether de facto relationships constitute family relationships point to these 
qualities. See cases discussed in note 88(?) infra.  
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bad. The nephew in our example is not in a family relationship with his aunt and uncle because 
the co-residency arrangement is time-limited as are any mutual obligations of the parties. The 
core qualities we have identified – a demonstrated, long-term commitment and the assumption of 
mutual care and financial responsibility -- increase the likelihood that family relationships will 
be stable and sustainable and can be relied on to fulfill the important functions of satisfying 
dependency needs. 
C.  MARRIAGE AS AN ENDURING FAMILY FORM  
 Although it would seem that other groups that embody the qualities of well-functioning 
families might qualify for  legal recognition and protection, marriage continues to be the sole 
legal family accorded full legal protection. In this section we describe the legal attributes of 
marriage that aspiring families do not (but might wish to) enjoy. We then briefly review the 
critiques of contemporary law by scholars and advocates, many of whom challenge the continued 
utility of marriage. We conclude that despite its deficiencies, marriage seems likely to retain its 
protected status; this is so because lawmakers and the public continue to view marriage as a 
relatively well functioning family form, a view with some empirical support.  
1.  Contemporary Marriage as a Privileged Status 
Marriage is a relationship defined by legal rights and obligations that do not apply to 
other families.
46
 Marriage confers tangible financial benefits and privileges, including social 
security survivor benefits, estate tax exclusions, health insurance benefits for government 
employees, as well as special status under residential zoning laws and the opportunity to protect 
property from creditors.
47
  Married couples are also granted rights and privileges based on the 
presumed closeness of their relationship, such as surrogate decisionmaking authority and 
                                                     
46
 The General Accounting Office famously reported more than 1000 references to marital status in the United States 
Code, many of which conferred benefits on married couples that other families do not enjoy. U.S. Government 
Accounting Office, Defense of Marriage Act (Publ. No. GAO-OGG-97-16, 1/31/1996 at 
http://w/archives/1997og97016.pdf 
47
 Perhaps the most comprehensive accounts have been offered by advocates seeking marriage rights for gays and 
lesbians and by courts holding that their exclusion violates the principle of equal protection. See Goodrich v. Dep’t 
of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d  941, 355-57 (2003) at _ (cataloguing marital rights and privileges under  
Massachusetts law);  Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (2009)(same under Iowa law). See also Nicole Berg, 
Designated Beneficiary Agreements: A Step in the Right Direction for Unmarried Couples, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 267 
(discussing marital benefits). See discussion in JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES KRIER, GREGORY ALEXANDER & 
MICHAEL SCHILL, PROPERTY (8
TH
 ED.) (2014) at 321 (discussing creditor protection dimensions of property acquired 
by spouses as tenants by the entireties.   
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inheritance rights.
48
  Further, as LGBT advocates have argued, marriage as a legally privileged 
family form carries intangible value beyond its tangible benefits.
49
 Married couples also have 
legal obligations to one another that are not imposed on members of non-marital families. By 
virtue of marital status, spouses cannot unilaterally disinherit one another,
50
  and under property 
distribution laws applied at divorce,
51
 each spouse has a right to share in earnings and property 
acquired during the marriage by the other.
52
  
To be sure, non-marital families are not deprived of all legal and constitutional rights.
53
 
But these groups are disadvantaged as compared to families based on marriage in many ways 
that can undermine their functioning. Adults in self-identified families can contractually assume 
financial obligations to one another but otherwise no familial rights or duties inhere in their 
relationships.
54
 Moreover, these relationships receive little support or recognition from the state; 
they do not receive social security spousal benefits, estate tax advantages, inheritance rights, or 
(usually) health insurance benefits.
55
  Further, although the parent-child relationship receives 
                                                     
48
 See Berg, id. at --.  . 
49
 In states that recognized civil union status for gay couples (replicating most marital rights), the emphasis shifted 
from tangible rights to the dignitary harm of exclusion. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d. 921 (2010) 
(finding Proposition 8 prohibiting same sex marriage unconstitutional, despite availability of civil unions) 
50
 See DUKEMINIER ET. AL, id. at 384-386.  
51
 See generally discussion of marital property rights and division on divorce IN IRA ELLMAN, ET. AL., FAMILY LAW: 
CASES, TEXTS, PROBLEMS 317- 350 (5
TH
 ED. 2010). 
52
 Wage-earning spouses may also be subject to a duty to pay alimony. Id. at _.  Spouses have a duty to rescue one 
another under tort law, whereas a non-marital family member faces no liability for allowing his loved one to starve. 
Jennifer Collins, Ethan Lieb & Dan Markel, Punishing Family Status, 1327 B.U. L. Rev. 1327 at 1335 (2008) 
(discussing special liability of parents and spouses for failure to rescue).   
53
 Most importantly, the parent-child relationship receives substantial legal protection, regardless of the marital 
status of the parents. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)(parents have constitutionally protected liberty interest 
to guide children’s education); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)(same); Yoder v. Wisconsin, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972)(state cannot apply mandatory attendance law to Amish children). The Court has also struck down 
laws discriminating against children born to unmarried mothers.  See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1969)(striking 
down statute prohibiting children born to unmarried mothers to sue under the state’s wrongful death statute);. 
Unmarried parents receive less protection than their married counterparts. See Michael v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 
(1989) (upholding California statute creating presumption of legitimacy for child born to married mother against 
child’s biological father seeking access). 
Courts, including the Supreme Court, Sometimes have accorded legal protections to other non-marital 
families. Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)(finding ordinance definition of family that prohibited 
grandson from living with grandparent unconstitutional under Due Process clause). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1972)(state law prohibiting unmarried persons from having access to contraceptives violated 14
th
 
Amendment). 
54
 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P2d. 106 (Cal. 1976)(holding contracts between cohabitants enforceable). 
55
 It is not surprising that activists for same sex couples’ relationship rights in response to the AIDS crisis: the 
experience of exclusion from family health benefits, medical proxy decision-making authority and guardianship 
priority underscored that even long-term committed gay and lesbian relationships received no legal protection. See 
Part IIIA, infra. Indeed, until recently, these unions were legally prohibited in many states. See Lawrence v Texas, 
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substantial legal protection,
 56
 the relationship between unmarried parents does not.
57
 The 
dependent parent has no claim to alimony or a share of her partner’s property if the relationship 
ends even though these financial awards redound to the benefit of the children. Unmarried 
parents also have no inheritance rights; children in non-marital families may have to share a 
parents’ estate with a more distant relative not living in the household.  
Scholars and law reform advocates have sharply criticized the elevated legal status of 
traditional marriage and argued for legal protection of other family relationships.  The LGBT 
marriage equality movement has offered the most prominent and successful challenge, of 
course.
58
 But other reformers have argued that a broad range of non-marital families-- including 
single parent families, unmarried couples and their children and adults in non-conjugal 
relationships-- should be accorded legal parity with marriage.”59 Finally, a few scholars have 
explored the social and legal response to polyamory and tackled the challenge of designing a 
regulatory regime for polygamous relationships.
60
 
The contemporary critique has shifted somewhat from the well-established feminist 
argument that marriage is a hierarchical, patriarchal institution that oppresses women to a 
broader challenge based on principles of liberty, equity and equality.
61
   Many critics today focus 
                                                                                                                                                                           
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding criminal anti-sodomy statute unconstitutional as a violation of same-sex consenting 
adults’ right of privacy). 
56
 See note _ supra (discussing protection of parent-child relationship.  Further many government programs aim to 
provide services to children of unmarried parents in poor families. Medicaid, SCHIP and WIN programs are 
federally funded. Many states also have child care programs. For a comprehensive discussion of safety net 
programs, see generally JANET CURRIE, THE INVISIBLE SAFETY NET: PROTECTING THE NATION’S POOR FAMILIES 
AND CHILDREN (2006).    
57
 Meryl Weiner, Caregiver Payments and the Obligation to Give Care or Share, 59 Vill. L. Rev. 135 (2014) 
(explaining that few financial obligations run between unmarried parents to the detriment of caregivers and arguing 
for increasing those obligations for both unmarried or married parents).  
58
 See generally Stoddard, supra note --. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE (1996). But see 
Franke, Longing for Loving, supra note -- (arguing that after Lawrence v Texas, gays and lesbians should fight to 
protect the unregulated territory for relationships between marriage and criminality, an area endangered by 
marriage).  For a breakdown of state laws, see National Center, supra note _. 
59
 See generally Nancy Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic Partnership Principles are one 
Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. Chi. L. Forum. 353 (expressing approval of the ALI Principles on this ground). 
Martha Fineman and Judith Stacy argue for the abolition of marriage. See note 1 supra. See BEYOND CONJUGALITY, 
id.   
60
 See gen. Davis, supra note 7; Elizabeth Lesher, Protecting Poly: Applying the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Nonmonogamous, 22 Law & Sexuality 127 (2013) (developing substantive due process argument for legal 
protection of polyamorous relationships); Emens, Monogamy’s Law, supra note --,  probes the hostility to 
polyamorous relationships and describes non-pathological nature of these relationships . 
61
 Of course, some feminists continue to reject marriage as harmful to women, emphasizing that married women’s 
caretaker\homemaker role often leaves them financially vulnerable on divorce. See Weiner, supra note _ at 135 to 
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primarily on the deficiencies of marriage
62
 and on the harm to non-marital families of privileging 
marriage and withholding its benefits from other groups that fulfill family functions.
63
  Other 
scholars argue that the liberal state should support a broad range of family options, allowing 
individuals to pursue their conception of the good life.
64
 
A general theme emerges from these critiques: A wide range of diverse families function 
(at least) as well as (different sex) marriage and the exclusive legal privileging of marriage can 
no longer be justified. The various critiques accept the social value of families, but challenge the 
notion that traditional marriage warrants the special status that it has long enjoyed.
65
    
2. The Durability of Marriage as a Family Form   
Even though many contemporary marriages do not embody qualities of stability and 
mutual care,
66
 substantial evidence supports that marriage continues to be widely regarded as a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
137.  But see Goldberg, supra note 2 at 233-34 (pointing to legal reforms that have created formal gender equality in 
marriage to challenge argument that marriage by gays would transform the institution). 
62
 Judith Stacey, for example, derides marriage as a flawed and obsolete institution in an era in which almost half of 
marriages dissolve and many spouses (mostly husbands on her account) fail to live up to their vows. See generally 
Judith Stacey, Forsaking No Others: Coming to Terms with Family Diversity, in GARRISON AND SCOTT, MARRIAGE 
AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 2 at 201 
63
 See Martha Fineman, supra note 1 (marriage is the key mechanism through which dependency is privatized in 
American law). See also POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, supra note --. Polikoff’s book (and 
earlier work) comprehensively argues for protection of all families and documents the harms to non-marital families 
under the current regime. She argues that the legal benefits associated with marriage, such as family health 
insurance, social security survivor benefits and inheritance rights, are just as important to the welfare unmarried gay 
and straight couples, siblings, adult children living with elderly parents and other groups living in long term 
relationships. See also Nancy Polikoff, Ending Marriage as We Know It, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 201 (2003).  
64
 See Eskridge, Family Law Pluralism, supra note 8 at 1818-1725(arguing for a utilitarian approach of guided 
choice to family formation that supports individual flourishing and the value to family members); Shahar Lifschitz, 
supra note--. See also Shahar Lifschitz, supra note _(arguing for family pluralism as an intrinsic value and 
challenging the imposition of mandatory obligations on cohabitants).  
65
 A few scholars have questioned the law’s deferential treatment of families.  Mary Anne Case, for example, 
challenges the assumption that employers, employees and taxpayers should be responsible for substantially 
subsidizing parents in their role of raising their children. Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few 
Troubling Questions about Where, Why and How the Burden of Care for Children Should be Shifted, 76 Chi-Kent 
L. Rev 1753 (2001). Other scholars have challenged of benefits of family status in the criminal justice system, 
criticizing testimonial privilege, sentence reductions and effective immunity from prosecution for harboring a family 
member. See Collins, Leib and Markel, supra note --. 
66
 The relatively high divorce rate in this country varies substantially on the basis of class; it has declined 
substantially since the mid-1980s for educated couples, but remained high for working class couples.  See JUNE 
CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY, at15-16 
(2014). Spouses can avoid financial interdependence through separate bank accounts and (in many states) property 
ownership and premarital agreements.  See discussion of marital property ownership in equitable distribution (vs 
community property jurisdictions, supra note --. 
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well-functioning family form.
67
  Public attitudes toward marriage are positive;
68
 most 
individuals, even in non-marital families, aspire to marriage.
69
 Moreover, courts and legislatures 
often have invoked marriage as the template for evaluating the claims of parties in non-marital 
family relationships that their affiliations should qualify for legal benefits.
70
 It is not surprising 
perhaps that advocates seeking legal protection for these relationships emphasize their similarity 
to marriage.
71
  
The empirical evidence as well indicates that families based on marriage, even today, 
tend to embody the qualities we have identified as contributing to satisfactory family 
functioning. In general, spouses are much more likely to share income and property than are 
cohabiting couples.
72
 Moreover, despite the relatively high divorce rate, marriages tend to be 
more stable than informal family relationships; that stability translates into advantages for 
children in educational attainment, social adjustment and other measures of well-being.
73
 
                                                     
67
. 
68
 See discussion in note _ supra (citing survey that 78% plan to marry).  
69
 According to a 2013 Gallup poll, 78% of respondents who had never been married wanted to get married. When 
asked why they were not married at the present time, most respondents indicated they hadn’t found the right person, 
they were too young/not ready, or they were waiting because of financial considerations. Marriage, GALLUP, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage.aspx#1 (last updated Aug. 1, 2014). 
Social scientists find that marriage has become idealized as a marker of financial and personal success and is viewed 
as out of reach by many poor and working class individuals. Kathryn Edin has found that both women and men hold 
this view. KATHRYN EDIN, DOING THE BEST I CAN (2013); PROMISES I CAN KEEP (2005).  See also McLanahan and 
Garfinkel, supra note 27 at 151; Andrew Cherlin, The Growing Diversity of Two-Parent Families, id. at 290 
70
 For a discussion of the use of marriage as a template for family relationships both by lawmakers and advocates in 
the marriage equality movement, see Part IIIA infra.  Courts also have compared relationships to marriage in 
evaluating whether they qualify as “family” relationships. See also Braschi v. Stahl Associates, supra note _.   
71
 See discussion in text accompanying notes _ to _ infra. The priority assigned by LGBT advocates to attaining 
marriage rights for same-sex couples suggests the continued importance of marriage. See Part IIIA infra. This 
priority has been controversial in the gay community.  Paula Ettelbrick and Thomas Stoddard famously debated 
whether marriage should be a key political goal of the gay community.  See Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People 
Should Seek the Right to Marry, Outlook, Fall 1989, at 9; Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to 
Liberation?, Outlook, Fall 1989, at 14. See also Katherine Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2685 
(2008)(challenging efforts to gain marriage equality by arguing that same sex relationship are marriage-like). 
72
 See Michael Pollard and Kathleen Harris, Cohabitation and Marriage Intensity: Consolidation, Intimacy and 
Commitment, RAND, Natl Instit. Child Health & Hum Devp’t. (2013). These researchers compared marriage and 
cohabitation, using a large data set of young adults . They found that 68% of married couples had joint checking 
accounts v. 16% of cohabitants. Marital property is shared on divorce unless the spouses affirmatively opt out 
through premarital agreements, an option chosen by only a small percentage of married couples. Heather Mahar, 
Why Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements?, Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business 
Discussion Paper Series, Discussion paper 436, September, 2003, at http://www.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ 
(describing studies finding 1.5%, 5%, and 5%-10% of marrying couples have prenuptial agreements).  
73
 The recent National Survey of Family Growth found that almost half of those cohabitation unions that do not 
transition to marriage dissolved within three years. 40 percent of first cohabitation transitioned to marriage by 3 
years, 32% remained intact and 27% dissolved. Casey Copen, Kimberley Daniels, & William Mosher, First 
Premarital Cohabitation in the United States: 2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth, Nat’l Health Statistics 
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Although many factors contribute to the differences, including substantial selection effects, some 
of the benefits accruing to marital families inhere simply in the stability of marriage itself.
74
   
Scholars have argued that the relative stability of marital families in part is a function of 
legal and normative influences on the behavior of spouses that support the bond between them. 
The formal commitment undertaken by couples entering marriage is not casual; it is typically 
involves the ceremonious assumption of mutual obligations.
75
  Marriage can be set aside only 
through the formal legal process of divorce, which even today carries high social and legal 
costs.
76
  But beyond its formal legal structure, marriage is embedded in informal social norms 
that prescribe expectations for spousal behavior and underscore its nature as a family relationship 
defined by long-term commitment.  These norms are internalized, reinforcing trust, and are also 
enforced externally through informal sanctions.
77
 Although the norms regulating marriage 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Rep. Center for Disease Control, April 4, 2013 at 5. Get 5 year statistics.  Pollard and Harris, supra note _, found 
substantially lower levels of commitment between cohabitants than between spouses.  
Sara McLanahan and her colleagues n an important longitudinal study, the Fragile Families and Child Well Being 
Study, have found that children born to unmarried parents are far less likely to be living with both parents at age five 
than those born to married parents. See discussion of study, supra note – 
74
 More educated and wealthier couples marry are far higher rates than poorer, less educated couples and many of 
the differences in outcomes can be attributed to this selection effect. See CAHN AND CARBONE, supra note _ at _. But 
not all. See Robert Emery, Erin Horn, and Christopher Beam, Marriage and Improved Well-Being, in Garrison & 
Scott, MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 2 at 126 (using twin study to confirm marital benefits). See also 
Deborah Carr and Kristen Springer, Advances in Families and Health: Research in the 21
st
 Century, J. Marriage & 
Fam. 742 (2010)(review of research showing marital benefits).  This does not mean, of course, that coercing 
unmarried couples to marry would produce stability.  
75
 For a discussion of the role of wedding ceremonies and traditions such as wedding rings in reinforcing marital 
commitment, see Elizabeth Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901(2000).  
See also Elizabeth S. Scott, A World without Marriage, 41 Fam. L. Q. 531 (Fall 2007). 
76
Economists Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak argue that the high cost of divorce, including the internalized sense 
of personal failure, defines marriage as a relationship of inter-temporal commitment and is a key distinction between 
marriage and cohabitation.  On their view, this commitment facilitates a long term investment in children, a goal that 
motivates contemporary marriage. Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak , Cohabitation and the Uneven Retreat from 
Marriage in the U.S., 1950-2010,  September 2013 at NBER Working paper 19413 at 
14http://www.nber.org/papers/w19413.  
Upon dissolution, the financial obligations undertaken by the spouses usually are legally enforceable. See Elizabeth 
Scott & Robert Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225 (1998)(describing through property 
distribution on divorce).  In community property states, property and income acquired during marriage is community 
property. In other states, marital property is subject to equitable distribution on divorce, unless the couple opts out 
through a prenuptial agreements.  See generally ELLMAN, ET AL., at 317-380 for a discussion of property distribution 
on divorce). See also text accompanying note _ infra (discussing small portion of couples executing prenuptial 
agreements). 
77
 Scott, Social Norms, supra note -- (arguing that traditional marriage was regulated by commitment norms and 
gender norms, which became bundled, contributing to contemporary criticism of marriage). The couple’s 
community sanctions violations through gossip and other expressions of disapproval. Id at 1920-1923. 
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function imperfectly in contemporary society,
78
 they tend to support marital commitment by 
guiding spouses’ behavior in ways that strengthen relationships and deter behavior that may have 
a destabilizing effect on the relationship. 
 In sum, marriage occupies a secure status as a legally recognized family with broad 
public support. Moreover, although marriage has become both less common and less stable in 
modern times, the weight of the evidence is that marriage as a category continues to fulfill 
relatively well the functions that justify its protected legal status.  
C. EXTENDING STATE BENEFITS TO OTHER FAMILIES 
The fact that the law confers deference and societal resources on marriage does not mean 
that the privileged status of this traditional family form should be exclusive.  In a liberal society, 
fundamental principles of autonomy support a state policy that promotes pluralism and provides 
opportunities for individuals to form family relationships that bring happiness and satisfy their 
needs.
79
  Moreover, the current social climate makes such a pluralist approach feasible.  But 
while autonomy values argue for expanding choice beyond traditional legal boundaries, social 
welfare concerns predictably will be invoked to justify restricting family status to those 
relationships that predictably will fulfill the legitimate state interest in reliably satisfying 
dependency needs. Legal privileging of families absorbs resources that are not available for other 
social purposes: estate taxes not paid by surviving spouses, for example, are lost to the federal 
treasury. Nonetheless, this allocation of resources is justified when an aspiring family group 
fulfills the socially valuable functions identified above, thereby relieving the state of part of its 
collective obligation to care for dependency. In sum, while not all claimants warrant special 
family status, groups that care adequately for members’ dependency needs and have the qualities 
of commitment, durability and emotional and financial interdependence deserve legal 
recognition and support. 
On occasion, lawmakers have acknowledged this point.  As we have discussed, legal 
benefits are sometimes extended to adult de facto relationships on the basis of their similarity to 
                                                     
78
 Id. at 1940. This is so for two reasons: first, the norms themselves are weaker and, second, the greater anonymity 
and mobility of urban society dilutes their effectiveness.   
79
 A pluralist approach allows individuals to pursue their own conceptions of the good life, which for many people 
surely includes living in families that satisfy physical and emotional needs.  Supra note – (citing articles arguing for 
pluralist approach.  
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marriage.
80
 Courts have also recognized de facto parent-child relationships in situations in which 
an adult has functioned in a parental role for an extended period in a family setting.
81
  But 
despite general public tolerance of a diverse range of families, the success of gays and lesbians in 
gaining access to marriage represents the only discernible trend toward elevating the legal status 
of a category of non-traditional family.   
This presents a puzzle. In a society in which the public accepts family diversity, and 
acknowledges the importance of families to individual and collective welfare, what explains the 
legal inertia?  Are there particular conditions that impede legal recognition of non-marital 
families? The answers to these questions can shed light on why some non-marital families have 
failed to obtain legal protection despite more tolerant social attitudes.  
 
II. A COLLABORATIVE MODEL OF THE EVOLUTION OF NOVEL FAMILY 
FORMS 
In this Part, we seek to explain the legal inertia and to specify a process by which aspiring  
family groups might attain their goal. We develop an informal model that describes a multi-stage 
collaborative process by which novel family forms can achieve legal status as families. Our analysis 
begins with the premise that the state appropriately grants legal privileges and benefits to families 
because these groups supply important social goods for which the state would otherwise be 
responsible.
82
  In Part IIA, we show that, owing to the effects of uncertainty about whether novel 
family groups satisfy this criterion, the parties face challenging conditions that impede their progress 
                                                     
80
 Courts assessing whether some non-marital couples deserve recognition as “families” have evaluated their 
relationships against a metric of marital family behavior and attributes—pointing to their durability, history of  
financial interdependence, care during illness and intimate companionship. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co, 543 
N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (couple qualify as “family” under rent control ordinance based on marriage-like 
relationship).  See also Connell v. Francisco, 898 P2d. 831 (Wash. 1995)(upholding equitable distribution of 
property between cohabitants on basis of  marriage-like quality of relationship). See also Douglas NeJaime, Before 
Marriage: The Unexplored History of Non-marital Recognition and its Relationship to Marriage, 102 Cal. L. Rev. 
87, 113 (2014) (explaining that California advocates for domestic partnership rights in 1990s argued that gay unions 
were marriage-like). 
81
 Many cases involve lesbian de facto parents living with the child and legal (birth) mother. Courts have allowed 
visitation rights when petitioners can show they functioned as a parent with the agreement of the parent for an 
extended period of time. See e.g. V.C v. M.J.B, 748 A2d 549 (N.J. 2000) (de facto parent had standing to seek 
visitation). When the gay couple marries, the spouse becomes the legal parent to children born to the marriage.  
82
 We do not challenge that historically marital privilege may have had other justifications, but assume that in 
contemporary society, the legitimacy of marital privilege is based on its social utility as a family form.   
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toward gaining legal recognition as families.  In Part IIB, the uncertainty is resolved in the model 
through three stages of an integrated process, each of which is defined by a form of collaboration. 
Collaborative engagement in the development of novel commercial relationships provides exemplars 
of how these impediments have been overcome in other contexts. This analysis illuminates the 
mechanisms parties use to make credible commitments to each other, signal those commitments to 
others, and engage with the state in verifying their compliance with established norms. 
A.  CONDITIONS IMPEDING THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF NOVEL FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS.
We begin with a thought experiment. Consider a group composed of two men and two 
women, who have developed close emotional and sexually intimate relationships with one 
another and wish to live together as a single family bound by a long term commitment to mutual 
support, interdependency and equality.
83
 They plan to pool their earnings and property and to 
have children and care for them collectively. Will this group face conditions that impede their 
efforts to secure the rights and obligations currently bestowed on marital families?  Our thought 
experiment yields the prediction that an aspiring polygamous family
84
 will confront three 
significant obstacles on the path to legal recognition. 
The first challenge this group faces is relational uncertainty or novelty: family relationships 
such as these are experimental, and even close emotional bonds are not predictive of whether 
the group will function well as a family. Lacking models of similar relationships that have 
succeeded in forming families, the individual members of the polygamous family will be unsure 
whether their affiliation will be durable and whether the trust and confidence that support long-
term commitment will develop. A second difficulty inheres in the fact that novelty also implies 
idiosyncrasy.  In the initial stage, there are few other polygamous families with similar 
aspirations with whom to share experiences. Thus, even if they can develop the means to create 
the necessary trust in each other’s capabilities, a polygamous family may be socially isolated, 
lacking a community of similar aspiring families. The nature of their relationship will also be 
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 The commitment of our hypothetical polygamous family to formal equality and mutual support and loyalty 
distinguishes this aspiring family from other polygamous groups, such as fundamentalist Mormons, that are 
organized hierarchically around a single dominant male figure. See Davis, supra note -- at 1. 
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 Polygamy is defined as plural marriage with multiple spouses regardless of the gender combination. Polygyny is 
the familiar form of one man and multiple wives. Our group aspires to legal recognition of plural (or polygamous) 
marriage.  See Emens, Monogamy’s Law, supra note 300-303 (clarifying terms). Polyamorous relationships do not 
imply the commitment of family relationships as we have defined them; thus our family is “polygamous.” 
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unfamiliar to the public, which may view this novel family with suspicion –and perhaps 
hostility.
85
  This isolation creates a daunting obstacle to recognition at the level of practical 
politics, of course,
86
 but also means that aspiring polygamous families are not (or are only 
weakly) integrated into the larger normative community that defines expectations for family 
behavior. 
A final problem stems from the need to persuade the state to extend legal recognition to 
polygamous families as a recognized family form in exchange for their readiness to assume 
family responsibilities.  The state faces a serious information deficit in evaluating whether this 
new category of family has the qualities that justify special legal treatment. This is because 
family functioning is largely private and the durability and adequacy of the novel group may be 
hard to assess.  Thus, state actors face informational barriers in sorting groups deserving of 
family status from other groups that may seek the privileges and resources allocated to families 
but fail to create the welfare benefits the state requires.
87
   In the discussion that follows, we 
argue that in combination these conditions impose significant obstacles to efforts by a 
hypothetical polygamous family to secure legal family status.  
1.  The Problem of Relational Novelty 
To some extent, the problem of novelty is almost universal when adults form family 
relationships. Individuals must establish trust in each other’s character and have confidence in 
their respective abilities before they can make credible commitments to undertake the demanding 
roles required.  Although some people report having a love-at-first-sight experience when they 
met their future life partners, more typically the process of finding satisfactory and lasting family 
relationships is one of experimentation and adjustment. Commitment is usually tentative when 
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 The public reaction to polyamorous groups is very likely to be hostile. See survey of public attitudes, supra note_.  
Other novel families, such as voluntary kin, may meet skepticism but less animus. See discussion in Part IIIC.   
86
  We argue in Part IIB3 that the formation of interest group networks is likely to be an important means of 
pursuing the goal of legal recognition.   
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 A legal status (such as marriage) carrying benefits and privileges carries a moral hazard risk. See Kerry Abrams, 
Marriage Fraud, Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012)(describing government strategies to prevent fraudulent claims to various 
marriage benefits).  The risk will likely be (and has been) a concern when novel families seek recognition. For 
example, when advocates sought domestic partnership status for gay couples in California in the 1990s, insurance 
companies’ insisted the status be defined so that only marriage-like couples qualified. The companies feared that 
individuals with AIDS would register with sympathetic friends, thereby qualifying for health insurance. See, e.g., 
NeJaime, supra note – at 115 (2014) (explaining that insurance carriers “resisted adding domestic partnership 
coverage without assurances that this new relationship status would be characterized by a marriage-like level of 
commitment”).  
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relationships are new and grows over time unless or until one or both of the parties realizes that 
the relationship is unsuccessful. Moreover, the parties may differ in their intentions and 
investment in the union. Each hopes that the prospective partner will be a trustworthy and 
competent caretaker and that emotional attachments will mature and endure. But only through 
experience can parties evaluate accurately whether their relationships embody the qualities that 
define successful families.
88
    
The level of uncertainty is significantly greater when individuals, such as those forming a 
polygamous family, experiment with novel family forms. Aspiring families are by nature 
experimental; the parties lack exemplars to guide them in family behavior and must adapt and 
adjust their roles and interactions over time as they seek to fulfill family functions in uncharted 
settings.
89
  Some forms may work better than others to satisfy dependency needs reliably.  The 
individuals forming a polygamous family, for example, will be uncertain whether multiple adults 
in a conjugal group will function effectively to care for one another and their children in stable 
committed relationships. Increasing the number of adults beyond a partnership of two individuals 
adds complexity to the relationship, and with complexity may come a greater potential for 
exploitation, conflict, or alliances within the group—all of which might contribute to 
instability.
90
 Even if these risks are never realized, the evidence of whether a novel family form 
is viable can only be acquired through extended experience. Only when the heightened level of 
uncertainty is substantially resolved can the parties determine that their polygamous family has 
the caring qualities and the enduring character that the social welfare criterion requires.  
2. Social Isolation: The Absence of Associational Bonds and Public Acceptance 
Even if the adult members of a polygamous family gain confidence and trust in one 
another as a functioning family, other challenges remain.  In the early period of its evolution, the 
isolated novel family typically lacks a community of similar families; this creates two problems. 
First the polygamous family must rely solely on its own members’ commitment and resources 
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 The evidence that almost half of cohabiting couples marry in 3 years suggests that many relationships go through 
the kind of experimentation we describe. Copen, et. al, supra note _.   
89
 For example, polygamous families such as ours, cannot model their relationships on marriage. But because they 
are dedicated to formal equality among all adult members, they would not receive substantial normative support 
from those polygamist groups, such as fundamentalist Mormons, that function as male dominated hierarchies. 
90
 Fundamentalist Mormon groups may maintain stability through a rigid hierarchical structure, which we reject as 
unacceptable in a modern family. Adrienne Davis identifies these challenges and argues they can largely be resolved 
through partnership regulation. See discussion in Davis, supra note _, 2002-2017.  
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for success.  The absence of a broader social group leaves the polygamous family without the 
benefit of friends and neighbors who offer support and enforce behavioral norms,
91
 important 
sources of stability for marital families.  Moreover, even as their numbers increase, success in the 
political arena is unlikely unless polygamous families affiliate and form an interest group (or 
groups) dedicated to achieving their shared political goals of attaining legal recognition. Without 
such coordination, polygamous families may fulfill family functions well but they are still likely 
to retain their outsider status. In short, the novel family faces the challenge of overcoming 
isolation and creating a network of families capable of developing group norms and mobilizing 
political action to gain support for the group’s legal recognition.92 
Successful mobilization poses daunting challenges for novel families.
93
 Due to 
polygamous families’ separation from society, the public initially may be unaware of the group’s 
existence and later may find their family relationships to be strange and unfamiliar.  Public 
awareness is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for legal recognition. But even in an era of 
more tolerant public attitudes, growing public awareness may engender skepticism or hostility 
based on assumptions that polygamous families will not function adequately as families, or that 
they may harm dependent members, or are engaging in immoral behavior.
94
  Thus, the aspiring 
family category faces the challenge of demonstrating to the larger community that they are 
faithfully performing family roles, a difficult task given that families function largely in the 
private sphere.  Further, the anticipation of a hostile public response may inhibit the inclination 
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 As we discuss below, the creation of a network of aspiring families, may be a key intermediate step in a norm 
formation process between a period in which small numbers of families function in isolation and one in which the 
novel family group attains some level of public acceptance. 
92
 Our description of the process is stylized and real isolation likely exists only in the earliest stage. See VERTA 
TAYLOR AND NANCY WHITTIER, COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT COMMUNITIES: LESBIAN FEMINIST 
MOBILIZATION, FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 104-29 (1992) (“…the purposeful and expressive 
disclosure to others of one’s subjective feelings, desires, and experiences – or social identity – for the purpose of 
gaining recognition and influence is collective action”). 
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 A substantial literature focuses on the role of social movements in advancing legal and constitutional reforms. 
Some scholars have analyzed the mobilization and impact of identity-based social movements. See William 
Eskridge, Channeling: Identity-based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 419 (2001) (describing 
the mobilization of the gay rights movement).  Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres, CITE. See text accompanying note 
_infra for a discussion of social mobilization to attain family rights.    
94
 The testimony in the Congressional hearings for the Defense of Marriage Act in 1995 was replete with allegations 
that gay relationships were immoral, promiscuous, and harmful to children. See e.g. Congressional Rec., Statement 
by Cong. Sensenbrenner, July 12, 1996. Today polygamous families face a similar response. See text accompanying 
notes -- to -- infra.  
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of these families to publicize their family relationships.
95
  But if they are “closeted,” polygamous 
families will find it more difficult to gain public acceptance as well- functioning families.   
Public ignorance or skepticism about the qualities of an aspiring family category 
undermines the prospect of legal recognition.
96
 Although the relationship between public 
attitudes and legal reform in the realm of civil rights is complex,
97
 some level of public tolerance 
and receptiveness is (and has been) a predicate to the willingness of political actors and courts to 
confer new family rights.
98
 Moreover, a community of polygamous families that is separated 
from the larger society largely lacks the benefit of the normative framework regulating family 
behavior that generally stabilizes and supports those families that already enjoy social 
recognition.
99
  
3.  The Verifiability Problem  
Even after polygamous families develop the trust and confidence to sustain their mutual 
commitments and affiliate with similar families in pursuit of public acceptance and legal 
recognition, the state confronts a severe information problem in verifying the petitioning groups’ 
family functioning.  Predictably not all relationships will qualify for the legal subsidy that is 
conferred on families, and even groups that have attained social acceptance may have a relational 
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 In Part IIIA, we describe how gay couples living in family relationships faced not only public animus, but 
criminal sanctions and loss of employment, which not surprisingly led many remain closeted. Most observers agree 
that the AIDS crisis and the lesbian baby boom were critically important in leading many gay couples to live openly 
and form networks in pursuit of the goal of legal protection of their family relationships. This in turn led to public 
familiarity.  
96
 See Part IIIA for discussion of the relationship between public familiarity and acceptance in the marriage equality 
movement.  See also MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE  197-203 (2013) (discussing relationship between changing public attitudes 
and legal reform).    
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 Michael Klarman has studied the relationship between public opinion and constitutional reform in other contexts. 
See MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY (2007)(discussing the public backlash to Brown v Board of Education).  See generally, JACK CITRON, 
EGAN AND NATHANIEL PERSILY (EDS.) PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (2008). 
98
 This does not mean that general acceptance is required. The early judicial opinions conferring marriage rights on 
gays and lesbians were criticized and not generally popular. [The Massachusetts legislature moved to amend the 
state constitution post-Goodridge, but reconsidered a year later.] KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR, 
supra note _ at 166-169. However, it seems likely that the public was more receptive to recognizing the rights of 
gays and lesbians in the early 21
st
 century than it would have been a generation earlier, when the possibility of legal 
marriage between same sex partners would have seemed fanciful to most people. See discussion in Part IIIA infra.  
99
 See Scott & Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, supra note --at 1288-93 (describing the role of informal 
social norms in enforcing terms of marriage contract and promoting cooperation and stability in intact marriage).  
There are clearly exceptions to the statement in the text. The Amish live separately from the larger society in a 
community regulated by robust social norms. But the basic norms that regulate Amish family behavior are modeled 
on those that regulate marriage generally. 
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form that imposes latent risks on vulnerable members.  The state has an independent interest in 
determining whether novel family categories seeking recognition function safely and 
successfully for all family members, an interest that may require a greater depth of knowledge 
than is needed to attain public acceptance.
100
 Accurate information is particularly important 
because legal recognition, once conferred, may be difficult to withdraw.  But the inherent 
privacy of family functioning poses a classic information problem: state actors making decisions 
about conferring family status may have difficulty discerning whether polygamous families as a 
category fulfill the functions and possess the qualities that make family relationships socially 
valuable.
101
  Many of the tangible qualities that characterize successful family groups such as 
financial interdependence and mutual care involve behaviors that are not readily observable to 
third parties. Moreover, intangible qualities that define families, such as long-term commitment, 
loyalty and equality are difficult to evaluate in the absence of express promises or reliable 
proxies. Thus, distinguishing well-functioning family categories from exploitative or less stable 
affiliations poses a challenge for state actors, who may have difficulty getting reliable evidence 
about the nature of claimants’ relationships.  
B. THE EVOLUTION TOWARD LEGAL RECOGNITION THROUGH COLLABORATION 
1.  The Elements of Collaborative Behavior.  
Our social welfare premise implies that the state will limit legal recognition to those 
categories of aspiring families that can overcome the impediments caused by relational novelty, 
social isolation and non-verifiability.   While the possible means of coping with these conditions 
are overlapping and interrelated, for analytical purposes we separate them into three, highly 
stylized evolutionary stages: 1) individuals (exemplars of the novel family type) form and 
successfully maintain families; 2) the individual exemplars form associational bonds that foster 
durable group norms and enable the collective to pursue the acceptance and support of the 
community at large; and 3) the state acquires the information about the particular context in 
which a novel family type functions to certify its entitlement to legal family status. 
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 See text accompanying footnotes 170-173 infra. 
101
 The problem of verifiability by third party decision makers has been of great interest to contracts scholars. The 
problem arises when courts must evaluate contract performance that cannot be specifically described. See Robert E. 
Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 Yale L. J814, 825 (2006). See also 
OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 35-38, n 15 (1995). 
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Our model uses exemplars from commercial contexts to show how each of the 
uncertainties that impede the recognition of novel family forms can be resolved by processes that 
we loosely describe as collaboration.  By collaboration we mean a set of behaviors designed to 
pursue a common objective that can only be achieved through the combined efforts of more than 
one party when the prospect of success cannot be determined until after each party makes 
investments in the relationship. Parties who collaborate commit to sharing private information, 
adjusting iteratively to the new information acquired from others, and relying on informal norms 
as the means of motivating each party to invest in the relationship.
102
 This technique builds trust 
in each party’s commitment to cooperate in pursuing substantive goals as well as confidence in 
the ability of the other(s) to perform their undertakings competently.
103
   
 Aspiring families, such as our polygamous family, can use collaborative techniques to 
respond to each of the three challenging conditions that we have identified.  At the first stage, 
joint collaborations between (or among) individuals aspiring to form polygamous families builds 
the trust and confidence needed to overcome the unique uncertainty caused by relational novelty.  
Collaborative agreements interweave formal commitments with informal norms in ways that 
respond to the uncertainty inherent in the process of experimentation. At the second stage, 
collaboration enables isolated polygamous families to overcome collective action problems and 
associate with other similar families in developing group norms and forming networks in pursuit 
of their goals of public acceptance.  Finally, at the third stage, collaboration between an aspiring 
category and the state facilitates joint action to mitigate the risk of harms that otherwise may 
impede certification of the family class.   At each of these evolutionary stages, the key 
collaborative behaviors of information sharing, iterative adjustment and informal enforcement 
are common elements.    
In the discussion that follows, we show how collaboration in the world of commercial 
contracting has facilitated effective responses to the conditions of relational novelty, social 
isolation, and non-verifiability.  We use these analogies to develop an extended example of how 
a novel family form can evolve from individual aspiring families that successfully develop 
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 Charles F. Sabel, A Real-Time Revolution in Routines in The Firm as a Collaborative Community 106 (Charles 
Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for 
Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 431, 446-448 (2009).  
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 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note --- at 1402-04. 
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mechanisms to ensure mutual care and support for their members, to an associational network 
that signals its identity with the larger normative community, and finally to the verification and 
certification by the state that members of the successful group are able reliably to fulfill family 
functions. 
2. Collaborative Contracting as a Means of Coping with Uncertainty.   
We begin with this question:  How can a polygamous family (of two men and two 
women) form a durable family without prior experience with one another or with the family 
form, and without normative guidance tailored to the form?
104
  The parties understand the 
functions of families and have general goals for their affiliation. But because of the novelty of 
their relationship and the dearth of similar family exemplars, the prospect of a durable 
commitment for on-going support, care and nurture is highly uncertain.  At the outset none of the 
aspiring family members knows whether making an enduring commitment is the best means of 
pursuing his or her best interests. For this reason, the parties cannot specify with any confidence 
defined obligations that will achieve their goals for the relationship.  In short, at the outset there 
is not only uncertainty about whether particular individuals can form these durable commitments 
but also uncertainty over whether the form itself is one in which the functions of families are 
fulfilled satisfactorily.  
a. A Commercial Analogue:  Collaborative Contracting in an Uncertain World. An 
analogue exists in the commercial realm to this vexing problem of relational uncertainty.  
Because of the increasing pace of technological development in the contemporary global 
environment, commercial actors sometimes need to find partners to share capabilities in pursuing 
a project that can only be defined and ultimately developed through their joint efforts.
105
  
Traditional modes of contracting often offer no solution to the contracting problems these parties 
confront. Facing these conditions of relational uncertainty, commercial actors innovate, 
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 Recall that our hypothetical polygamous family is committed to loyalty and equality among all adult members.  
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Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. Econ. Lit. 
629, 649 (2008) (hold-up problem “clearly pose[s] problems for long-term contracting, and those problems are 
exacerbated in volatile environments”). 
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searching for partners capable and willing to engage in on-going collaborations.
106
  These 
innovative “collaborative agreements” have become an essential part of doing business in the 
contemporary commercial environment.
107
  
In a number of industries characterized by rapid technological development,
 
conditions of 
high uncertainty have led to collaborations where both parties’ skills and commitment to 
cooperate are necessary to achieve success.
 108
  In settings as diverse as the pharmaceutical 
industry and manufacturing supply chains, parties have come to realize that the feasibility of 
many projects can only be determined by joint investment in the production of information to 
evaluate whether a project is profitable to pursue.
109
  An example is the research collaboration 
between a large pharmaceutical company with expertise in bringing new drugs to market and a 
smaller biotech firm with innovative technology. The collaborative agreement aims to explore 
the feasibility of jointly discovering and developing a novel pharmaceutical product.
110
  The 
common feature of these regimes is a commitment to joint exploration without imposing legal 
consequences on the outcome of the parties’ collaborative activity other than in conditions of 
“bare-faced cheating.”111 Thus, neither party has a right to demand the performance that the 
parties imagine may result from a successful collaboration.  If the parties cannot ultimately agree 
on a final objective, they may abandon the collaboration.
112
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 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contracting for Innovation, supra note --.at 455-56; see also Gilson, Sabel & Scott, 
Braiding, at 1422. 
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b. Key Elements of Collaborative Agreements.  The ability of any party to exit the collaboration 
raises a central question:  What knits the collaborators efforts together?  After all, unless the parties can 
make credible commitments to invest in the relationship, the project will never get off the ground.  
Studies of these commercial collaborations provide answers to this key question.
113
  In brief, the 
collaboration rests on a governance structure that, over time, creates confidence in the capabilities and 
trust in the character of the counterparty. Trust and confidence are extremely valuable commodities: not 
only do they motivate each party to invest in the relationship but they also make the prospect of 
abandoning the relationship in order to collaborate with others much less attractive.
114
 
The governance of these commercial collaborations shares several common elements. The first 
element is a commitment to an ongoing mutual exchange of private information designed to determine if 
a project is feasible, and if so, how best to implement the parties’ joint objectives.  The second 
component is a procedure for resolving disputes. Its key feature is a requirement that the collaborators 
reach unanimous agreement on crucial decisions, with persistent disagreement resolved by unanimous 
agreement at higher levels of management from each firm.
115
  Together these two mechanisms make 
each party’s character traits and substantive capabilities observable and forestall misunderstandings.  
Working under conditions of uncertainty, the parties can expect to encounter unanticipated problems 
that can only be solved jointly and that may generate occasions of disagreement.  Their increasing 
knowledge of each other’s capacities and willingness to share private information in service of their 
collective goals facilitates the resolution of problems and constrains opportunistic behavior.
116
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makes observable to the parties actions that would be opaque in an unstructured, informal exchange.  This 
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This arrangement is distinctively limited in its goals, functioning only to allow the parties 
to learn about each other’s skills and capabilities for collaborative innovation and to develop 
jointly the routines necessary to pursue a desired objective.   But, importantly, the collaborative 
agreement does not commit either party to develop, supply or purchase any product or service. 
Rather, the object is to discover two things about the counterparty:  How well does the 
counterparty cooperate and how capable are they at working jointly toward the ultimate goal?  In 
this way, the governance structure provides the environment in which trust and confidence can 
grow: in effect, collaborative contracting endogenizes trust by formalizing a process that builds 
parties’ confidence in one another and thereafter supports investments in their joint objectives 
based on the trust created. The evidence indicates that if the collaborative process is successful, 
the uncertainties that existed at the outset of their dealings are resolved through accrued 
experience, giving rise to traditional contractual statements of obligation and remedy.
117
   
c.  Collaborative Contracting in the Family Context.   The collaborative contracting 
mechanism is ideal for experimentation in an effort to achieve a goal 1) that none of the parties 
can accomplish on his or her own; and 2) where the parties are unwilling, owing to uncertainty 
about the viability of the collaboration, to commit in advance to a sustained investment in the 
relationship.   These two conditions characterize the challenge facing parties desiring to establish 
novel family relationships. Consider again a hypothetical polygamous family.  As in the 
commercial context, these parties face uncertainty about the viability of the venture they aim to 
undertake: it is unclear whether this (or any other) polygamous family represents a stable and 
enduring model for fulfilling family functions satisfactorily. Moreover, novel relationships such 
as this are not supported by strong social norms defining behavioral expectations and 
encouraging long-term commitment.   
Under those conditions, the goals of this aspiring family can be furthered through 
processes that are analogous to the kind of collaborative agreements that have proved useful in 
commercial contexts. To be sure, the sources of relational uncertainty are somewhat different 
and the form of the agreement among individuals in a novel family group is likely to differ from 
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the commercial counterparts.  A major difference between commercial collaborative contracts 
and their nascent familial counterparts, for example, is the form of the governance arrangement 
that creates the environment within which trust and confidence can grow.
118
 In commercial 
settings, these structures are specified in formal written documents, while in the familial context 
the governance commitments typically arise out of mutual understandings often based on the 
parties’ conduct over time.  But this distinction does not diminish the significance or utility of 
the commitment to collaborate by an aspiring family unit.
119
   
 In both the commercial and familial cases, however, the enforceable commitment is 
limited at the outset to the obligation to collaborate on efforts to pursue the parties’ mutual 
goals.
120
  A polygamous family commits to pursue an objective—long term mutual care and 
support of each other and other dependents in their household -- under circumstances where they 
are uncertain about the ultimate success of the relationship (or even the specific form that it may 
take).  As noted above, the resulting agreement forms the basis for building trust as the 
foundation of a committed family. These collaborative agreements do not impose obligations to 
share property upon the dissolution of the relationship; the parties’ uncertainty about the success 
of the collaboration makes such precise commitments infeasible.  What then are the enforceable 
obligations of the family aspirants who do commit to collaborate?  By analogy to the commercial 
context, each party is free to abandon the relationship at any time without facing any legal 
consequences.  However, the initial commitment implies an enforceable obligation of family 
fidelity and loyalty during the period of ongoing collaboration.
121
  On this basis, evidence that 
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Conduct-based agreements sometimes raise difficult problems of proof, but if the conduct among members of a 
novel relational group is clear, this form of contracting carries the same degree of legal significance. Bailey v. West, 
249 A. 2d 414 (1969); Continental Forest Prods., Inc. v. Chandler Supply Co., 518 P. 2d 1201 (Id. 1974).  For 
discussion see ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 9 (5
TH
 ED. 2013).  Some courts 
and legislatures have required that contracts between cohabitants be written.  IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL, FAMILY 
LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 943 (5
TH
 ED. 2010) (describing the writing requirement in some states). 
120
 The unique feature of collaborative contracts is that they combine both legal and normative elements.  The formal 
contract is limited to enforcement of the reliance investments that parties have made in the commitment to 
collaborate.  See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Braiding, supra note – at 379-82, and text accompanying notes – to -- infra. 
121
 These contracts rely on low-powered enforcement techniques that cover only the commitment to collaborate, 
without controlling the course or the outcome of collaboration.  This means that defection from the commitment—
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one of the parties was pursuing another familial relationship during the collaboration or selfishly 
appropriating shared resources gives rise to an enforceable claim for the value of any 
investments that injured parties have made in reliance on the commitment.
122
 
Family collaborations have both disadvantages and advantages relative to their 
commercial counterparts. Family relationships do not lend themselves to the kind of hierarchical 
structure that motivates consensus in the business setting, where higher levels of management 
review disputes. On the other hand, the co-residency of aspiring-family members and their 
ability to monitor one another closely push the parties toward consensus and reinforce the 
collaboration in ways that establish trust. Moreover, the personal nature of the information 
shared by each party creates the potential for reputational harm if that information is later 
disclosed, making abandonment costly.
123
  
Not all collaborative contracts creating familial obligations will be successful; some 
parties’ relationships, and perhaps some relationship forms, may simply not develop into stable 
interdependent family groups. But in those relationships that do mature, understandings among 
the members of the polygamous family will become more complete through accrued experience 
as time goes on.
124
  In this way, the polygamous family will move beyond collaborative 
agreements to enforceable understandings about their performance obligations.
125
 Thus, just as 
parties in the pharmaceutical industry undertake formal agreements for drug development on the 
basis of information attained during the collaborative contract phase, so a polygamous family in 
a collaborative family relationship may reach formal understandings about property sharing, 
financial support and obligations for child care.  Again, as in the collaborative contract phase, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
say, by cheating on the exclusive commitment to care for each other—would only entitle the injured party to recover 
her reliance costs as measured by investments to date in the collaboration and any opportunities foregone.   For a 
commercial example of the kind of cheating on the commitment that creates liability and a discussion of the limited 
remedies available, see Medinol Ltd. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 346 F. Supp. 2d 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
122
 This limited enforcement may be more available to some novel families than others. Courts have ordered 
equitable remedies such as restitution and constructive trust in cases involving financial claims by cohabitants. See 
Harmon v. Rogers, 510 A2d. 161 (Vt. 1986); Salzman v Bachrach, 996 P2d 1263 (Colo. 2000). See discussion in 
ELLMAN, ET. AL., supra note _ at 943-44.  But if aspiring families are deemed immoral (as may be the case with 
polygamous families), courts may decline to enforce collaborative agreements.  
123
 Personal information shared in the family setting may be embarrassing if later disclosed, creating a situation 
analogous to hostage exchange.  Scott & Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, supra note – at 1290-91.  
124
 See Kyle J. Mayer & Nicholas S. Argyres, Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer Industry, 
15 Org. Sci. 394, 396 (2004) (finding that successive contracts between the same two contracting partners become 
more complex over time as the partners learn how to address contracting hazards). 
125
 See Part IIIB2 infra and discussion of commitment ceremonies among polygamous groups that aspire to legal 
family status. 
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these agreements may be understandings implied from conduct based on duration, shared duties 
and other objective proxies that arise over time in cohabitation relationships.
126
 
 In this first stage of collaboration, the evolutionary process we describe can result in an 
aspiring polygamous family bound by (usually implied) contract to provide each member mutual 
support and care with provisions for the assignment of responsibilities and for the distribution of 
property rights upon termination. Predictably, we would, over time, expect to find a number of 
aspiring polygamous families living in committed, contractually based relationships.  
3.  Moving from Isolated Collaborations to a Socially Integrated Collaborative 
Network. 
Even as a number of polygamous families establish stable family relationships based on 
contract, other challenges remain. How do isolated polygamous families coordinate to overcome 
collective action impediments and ultimately become integrated into the larger social 
community?  The process that leads first to association among polygamous families and then to 
integration serves two functions.  At a pragmatic level, coordination is necessary for the novel 
family to begin the process of pursuing its political goals. Isolated polygamous families are 
unlikely to attract public attention, gain acceptance, or effectively communicate their identity as 
successful families.  The formation of associations among aspiring novel families also facilitates 
the development of shared social norms and enables these polygamous families and their agents 
to signal collectively their identity with the larger social community.
127
 Integration into the 
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 As we explain in Part IIIB, this evolution to enforceable contracts together with default rules based on 
relationship duration can resolve the difficult problem of sorting non-marital cohabitation relationships.  One 
response is for the state to freely enforce contracts implied in fact that provide for mutual support and shared 
property rights in long term unions unless parties opt out. Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied 
Contracts and Law Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY (R. WILSON, ED.) (2006) (hereinafter Implied Contracts).  
127
 See text accompanying notes – to – infra. To some extent, of course, even isolated polygamous families may 
internalize norms of established families.  For a general discussion of the role of informal norms in regulating 
behavior through anticipation of external sanctions such as shaming or shunning,  see JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF 
SOCIETY 101-02 (1989); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. 
Rev. 338, 350-51 (1997); Robert Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to 
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643, 1656 (1996).See also Scott and Scott, Marriage as 
Relational Contract, supra note _  at 1288-93(discussing the role of norms in reinforcing marital commitment). 
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broader normative community further reinforces socially approved behavior and the stability of 
evolving relationships.
128
    
a. Normative Integration in Common Purpose Communities: The Case of 
Collaborative Networks.  Again we turn to the commercial context to provide an analogue for 
how family aspirants can resolve the problem of social isolation and form a coherent community 
with collective goals and shared norms. Commercial parties in particular industries form 
networks (or informal alliances) in order to enhance mutual collaboration in an environment 
where multi-lateral cooperation produces gains for all members in pursuit of their individual 
business ventures.
129
 These networks are not aided by formal association (although individual 
members may execute bi-lateral contracts), but are linked informally by cooperative norms.  
Research by organizational sociologists shows how shared norms evolve and successfully 
control opportunism and other non-cooperative behaviors in these networks even as new 
members join the network and others drop away.
130
 
A business network consists of a number of independent firms that enter a pattern of 
collaboration designed to achieve the benefits of cooperation without formal integration.
131
  Of 
particular interest for our example are networks consisting of a cluster of firms whose 
membership shifts over time.  A useful exemplar is the tech transfer network consisting of a 
university/research entity (inventor), a number of biotech companies, large pharmaceutical firms 
                                                     
128
 See Karen S. Cook & Russell Hardin, Norms of Cooperativeness and Networks of Trust in SOCIAL NORMS 327, 
328-330 (MICHAEL HECHTER & KARL-DIETER OPP EDS 2001) (parties have a strong interest in abiding by their 
community’s norms so as to avoid exclusion). 
129
 For discussion, see Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy:  Network Forms of Organization, 12 Res. 
Org. Beh. 2905 (1990); Walter W. Powell, Kenneth Koput & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Inter-organizational 
Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 Admin. Sci. Q. – (1996), 
and text accompanying notes – to -- infra. Networks stimulate the development of norms creating behavioral 
expectations that are internalized by network members and enforced informally by others. Walter W. Powell, Inter-
Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry, 152 J. Inst. & Theoretical. Econ. 197, --- (1996), and 
text accompanying notes – to -- infra. 
130
 Cook & Hardin, supra note—at 330-35; See also Michael Hechter & Karl-Dieter Opp, What Have We Learned 
About the Emergence of Social Norms in SOCIAL NORMS 394, 399-400 (MICHAEL HECHTER & KARL-DIETER OPP 
EDS 2001) (reviewing the literature). 
131
 GUNTHER TEUBNER & HUGH COLLINS, NETWORKS AS CONNECTED CONTRACTS 1 (HART PUB. 2011).  Network 
forms of organization share some common elements.  Parties engage in reciprocal, preferential, mutually supportive 
actions.  The basic assumption of network relationships is that one party is dependent on actions or behaviors of the 
other and that there are gains to be had from pooling resources to achieve common purposes.  As networks evolve, it 
becomes more efficient for parties to exercise voice rather than exit.  For discussion, see Walter W. Powell, Neither 
Markets Nor Hierarchy:  Network Forms of Organization, 12 Res. in Org. Beh. 295, 303-4 (1990). 
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and venture capital firms joined by their common interest in the development of therapeutic 
compounds to cure disease.
132
  These diverse entities share a desire to resolve uncertainty over 
the challenges they face collectively. To a large extent, network enforcement of these inter-party 
understandings is purely relational, relying on a combination of reputation, repeated dealings and 
tit for tat reciprocity.
133
  
 What are the factors that cause these bio-tech networks to form and then sustain 
themselves? In the context of rapid technological development, research breakthroughs are so 
broadly distributed that no single firm has all the capabilities necessary for success.  Research to 
produce further technological advances requires collective collaboration designed to pool the 
broadly dispersed information of a large number of firms.
134
  Thus, periods of rapid change 
stimulate a variety of collaborative behaviors aimed at reducing the inherent uncertainties 
associated with novel products or markets through the sharing of private information that 
benefits each firm in its own pursuits.
135
  Despite the absence of formal rights and obligations 
internal to members of the network, the evidence suggests that the forces that govern cooperation 
are durable, with trust and cooperation increasing with participation in the network.  When there 
is a recognition of common interests and a high probability of future association, parties are more 
likely to cooperate and also willing to punish defectors.
136
 Cooperation is a continuing strategy 
rather than a one-shot calculation; networks use a reputation for cooperation and trustworthiness 
as a guide to future interaction.
137
 At the level of the network community, there is a kind of 
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 These high tech networks have been studied extensively by organizational sociologists, see e.g., Walter W. 
Powell, Kenneth Koput & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Inter-organizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: 
Networks of Learning in Biotechnology, 41 Admin. Sci. Q. 116 (1996); Walter W. Powell, Inter-Organizational 
Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry, 152 J. Inst. & Theoretical. Econ. 197 (1996) and text accompanying 
notes – to -- infra. 
133
  See TEUBNER & COLLINS,  supra note--- at 21-25 (discussing the evolution of norms of trust and cooperation that 
are enforced informally). 
134
 Walter W. Powell, Networks of Learning in Biotechnology:  Opportunities and Constraints Associated with 
Relational Contracting in a Knowledge-Intensive Field in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 251, 252-53 (2001). 
135
 Id. At 265-66 
136
 For discussion of ways in which routines of cooperation develop, see ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION (1984). 
137
 Powell, Inter-Organizational Collaboration, supra note – at 207-208. 
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mutualism or normative integration. This community level mutualism is both self-maintaining 
and self-enforcing.
138
     
b. Network Collaboration and Normative Integration of Novel Families.  The research 
on collaborative business networks offers lessons about how novel polygamous families can 
overcome their initial isolation, affiliate with similar groups with compatible norms and, over 
time, develop and signal their identity with the larger community.  The key elements in 
successful network collaborations are 1) the pursuit of a shared purpose through exchange of 
private information; 2) collective recognition of the value of individual collaborators’ 
performance; 3) the adherence to norms of cooperation that advance the collective purpose; and 
4) the capacity of outsiders to gain membership in the network by developing a pro-social 
reputation.
139
 These elements support the prediction that as polygamous families evolve, they 
will form social networks around their common interests to advance their purpose of attaining 
social and legal recognition.  
 In the case of novel families, these network communities predictably emerge in response 
to the uncertainties associated with their shared vulnerability as social and legal “outsiders.”140  
Consider how a community of polygamous families might evolve from the collaborative 
contracting stage discussed above. As the number of families’ increases, they become aware of 
similar aspiring families with common interests and relational patterns as well as a common 
purpose of obtaining social acceptance and legal recognition. They also understand that informal 
affiliation (and ultimately formal organizations) can provide social support and reinforcement of 
their own relationship goals and assist them in attaining their social and political goals.
141
  
Today, this process likely can be facilitated by the internet, which provides a low-cost means to 
connect and interact with other polygamous families.
142
 The emerging community is reinforced 
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 Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust?  The Implications of Repeated Ties for Contractual Choice in 
Alliances, 38 Acad. Mgmt J. 85 (1995). 
139
 Walter W. Powell, Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation:  Networks of Learning in 
Biotechnology, 41 Admin. Sci. Q. 116, 119-124 (1996); Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network 
Forms of Organization, 12 Res. in Org. Beh. 295, 303-306 (1990). 
140
 See discussion in Part IIIA describing how gay and lesbian support groups developed in the struggle for legal 
protection of family relationships.   
141
 The literature on social movements is also informative here. See text accompanying notes _ to _ infra.  
142
 See e.g. www.polygamylifestyle.com , which invites polygamist groups to find others in their locality. Websites 
such as this avoid the risk of public exposure in the search for similar groups.    
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by interactions and information sharing that is more extensive and frequent than interactions with 
others outside the community, to whom polygamous families remain outsiders.
143
   
           Theory and evidence from other settings predict that as a network of polygamous families 
forms and mobilizes in pursuit of their common interests and goals, collective family 
commitment norms emerge, together with norms of cooperation, reciprocity and 
trustworthiness.
144
 The emergence of shared norms, enforced by the network community, 
strengthens each polygamous family’s commitment to fulfill family functions, creating a 
feedback effect that reinforces the norms that isolated polygamous families sought to establish 
through collaborative contracting.
145
 The normative structure of the network thus serves the dual 
functions of stimulating the emergence of norms of cooperation in relation to one another as well 
as reinforcing commitment norms in individual families. These norms of family fidelity are 
powerful behavioral regulators, reinforced through expressions of approval and informal 
sanctions such as gossip, shaming and exclusion.
146
 They are also durable because they enhance 
the willingness of members of the community to collaborate to achieve their common purpose.
147
  
The final step—the normative integration of novel polygamous families into the larger 
social community and their acceptance as fully functioning families—is one that is less well 
understood. Among the theories that have been offered, the literature on social movements offers 
insights about this process, at least as applied to some aspiring family categories.
148
 Prominent 
                                                     
143
 Members of polygamous groups may interact with others but are less likely to share information about their 
family relationships, for fear of social and legal sanctions.  See discussion, Part IIIA infra. See discussion at text 
accompanying notes – to -- infra.  Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, The Moral Economy of Communities:  
Structured Populations and the Evolution of Pro-Social Norms, 19 Evolution and Human Behavior 3,4 (1998). 
144
 Scott, Social Norms, supra note --  at 1908-1912 (describing norms of reciprocity, loyalty and fidelity in marriage 
as commitment norms). 
145
Richard McAdams has developed the most comprehensive theory to explain the origin and regulation of norms. 
He explains the conditions for norm creation as arising from a consensus within a community of the esteem-
worthiness of a target behavior. If there is also a risk of detection for deviation from the consensus and a capacity to 
publicize the deviation--through gossip or other informal or formal means-- a norm can arise.  McAdams, The 
Origin of Norms, supra note -- at 350-351 and passim.  Considerable empirical evidence supports the notion that 
peer disapproval is an effective sanction against disfavored behavior. See, e.g., HERBERT JACOB, DETERRENT 
EFFECTS OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL SANCTIONS IN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 69 (1980); Donna Bishop, Legal and 
Extra-legal Barriers to Delinquency: A Panel Analysis, Criminology (1984). 
146
 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1225, 1288-1292 (1998). 
147
 See Gulati, supra note _.  
148
 Sociologists have long studied how citizens organize themselves to pursue often transformative social and legal 
goals through social movements in contexts as varied as environmental justice, access to knowledge, civil rights and 
animal rights.  In recent years, many scholars have focused on the relationship between law and social movements. 
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legal scholars have analyzed identity-based social movements, in which individuals in legally 
disadvantaged groups have organized in pursuit of public acceptance, political recognition, and 
civil rights.
149
 The marriage equality movement, for example, is part of a larger social movement 
by gays and lesbians to attain equal citizenship.  As William Eskridge explains, collective action 
was stimulated by the designation of sexual orientation as a legally salient trait and source of 
discrimination.
150
  
Although collective action by aspiring families is the foundation of their normative 
integration into the larger society, theory suggests that committed leaders, or norm entrepreneurs, 
will play a key role in mobilization to attain public acceptance.
151
  These network leaders 
facilitate normative integration by creating organizational contexts for coordinating people and 
resources, and by developing strategies to utilize the media and other outlets to spread 
information about the successful functioning of polygamous families.
152
 Given that the ultimate 
                                                                                                                                                                           
See note 151 infra. See also Michael McCann, Law and Social Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 Ann. 
Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 17 (2006)(reviewing social movement theories and arguing for a legal mobilization approach). 
For an early article in the legal literature, see Edward Rubin, Passing through the Door: Social Movement Literature 
and Legal Scholarship,  150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2001).  
149
 Scholars have analyzed the impact of social movements on constitutional and public law reform.  See William 
Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U.Pa. L. Rev. 419 
(2006)(analyzing the dynamic interaction between identity-based movements and law). Reva Siegel has probed the 
impact of social movements on constitutional culture. Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 1323 (2006. See also Jack Balkin & Reva 
Siegel, Principles, Practices and Social Movements, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 927 (2006)( explaining how social 
movements can result in challenges to the legitimacy of customary practices as inconsistent with long-standing 
principles); Lani Guinier & Gerald Torres, Changing the World: Notes Toward a Demosprudence of Law and Social 
Movements, 123 Yale L.J. 2340 (2014)(describing impact of social movement on statutory and constitutional civil 
rights  reform).     
150
 Eskridge, id. at 433-434. Eskridge explains how urbanization promoted consciousness raising among gays, 
reducing the costs of collective action.  
151
 Both the social movement and other sociological literatures make this point. See Rubin, supra note _ (describing 
the key role of movement leaders in mobilization and information dissemination. See also Robert C. Ellickson, A 
Market Theory of Social Norms, 3 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 1, 10 ((2001)(describing influential opinion leaders as 
“moral entrepreneurs”); MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2000) (describing “mavens,” norm 
entrepreneurs who learn a great deal about emerging norms and then sharing that knowledge with others, thus 
serving to spread the information widely at low cost). Gladwell argues that mavens play a key role in spreading fads, 
fashions and (by implication) norms.  Id at ---. These leaders can organize mobilization, see note 154 infra. They 
also can generate norm cascades, a process of rapid norm change. See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Expressive 
Function of Law, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2021, 2035-36 (1996); Randall C. Picker, Simple Games in a Complex World: 
A Generative Approach to the Adoption of Norms, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1225 (1997). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Social 
Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903, 909 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Social Meaning and Social Norms, 
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2181 (1996).   
152
  See Rubin, supra note _ at 28-34; and note 61. Rubin describes the role of committed leaders in mobilizing 
resources and people to create a social movement. Rubin describes resources useful in mobilization expansively to 
include salient events (the Stonewall riots), court cases and media coverage, as well as money and funds. The use of 
media to dispense information is a key strategy of social movements. See McCann, supra note _ at 24. Today the 
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goal of the polygamous family group is legal recognition, and that some level of public 
acceptance is a predicate to attaining that goal,
153
 it seems likely that norm entrepreneurs in this 
context will organize formal interest groups and use legal tools in pursuit of the community’s 
goals;  predictably lawyers often will perform the function of norm entrepreneurs.
154
    
Scholars studying cultural change shed further light on the social integration process, 
documenting how outsider groups, once affiliated, can signal their identity with and become 
assimilated into the larger cultural community.
155
  The theory of identity signaling developed by 
economists studying changing social behaviors seems to fit the evolutionary process by which 
novel families become integrated into the larger society.
156
 Researchers have studied how 
cultural conventions and behaviors function as symbols of identity, communicating aspects of 
individuals or groups to others in the social world.
157
 Normative behaviors gain meaning, or 
signal value, through their association with groups or similar types of individuals.  The 
normative identity that polygamous families or other novel families signal is based on their 
family relationships of long-term commitment to mutual care and support; thus the essential 
elements of this identity are similar to those of established families.
158
 The society at large 
associates successful commitment norms with established families, and comes to recognize that 
polygamous families successfully perform familial functions, although their behaviors and 
                                                                                                                                                                           
internet is an important source of information dissemination. See note _ infra (describing informational web sites 
promoting polygamy and dispelling myths. See also Ellickson, The Market for Social Norms, supra note – at 18-22. 
153
 See discussion in KLARMAN, note _ supra.  
154
 Cause- lawyers have played a key role in pursuing and implementing legal change generated by social 
movements aimed at advancing racial and gender equality and gay and lesbian rights. See generally Austin Sarat & 
Stuart Scheingold, What Cause Lawyers do for and To Social Movements, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS, Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds. (2006). See McCann, supra note _ at 25-26 (generally 
discussing role of law and legal activism in advancing social movements).    
155
 See Berger, Identity Signaling, supra note – at 183 (“cultural tastes gain meaning or signal value, through their 
association with groups, or similar types of individuals”).  The recent history of changing public attitudes toward gay 
and lesbian relationships provides an example of this process of norm evolution and corresponding social change.  
See discussion in Part IIIA, infra. 
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 Berger, Identity Signaling, supra note ---; ERIC A. POSNER, A THEORY OF SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Eric A. Posner, 
Symbols, Signals and Social Norms in Politics and Law, 27 J. Legal Stud. 765 (1998).  These versions of signaling 
theory all draw on the work of MICHAEL A. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING (1974).  
157
 M. DOUGLAS & B. ISHERWOOD, THE WORLD OF GOODS:  TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSUMPTION (1978); 
M.R. Solomon, The Role of Products as Social Stimuli: A Symbolic Interactionism Perspective, 10 J. Cons. Res. 319 
(1983). 
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 William Eskridge describes a politics of recognition through which an identity group signals to the majority that 
the legally stigmatized trait is simply a benign variation and should not be the basis of legal discrimination.  
Eskridge, supra note _ at 467-77.  This equality- based claim (that novel families are similar to established families) 
is inherently integrative. Id at 487.  
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identity may not mirror precisely those of marital families.
159
 This process of identity signaling is 
advanced in part by advocates (and perhaps litigation strategists) who, by serving as norm 
entrepreneurs, accelerate the process of social change. As the cohort of novel families grows, 
public awareness of their identity increases as well, and if the identity signaling is successful,
160
 
a cascading process of changing social attitudes follows, culminating in public tolerance or 
acceptance.
161
 
Research on the mechanisms that produce social change also aid us in formulating 
predictions about this last phase of norm integration.   Jonah Berger documents a process of 
change occurring when an idea, cultural view or attitude spreads contagiously through 
continuous observation and word of mouth.
162
 This happens typically when the idea is associated 
with images or narratives linked to “arousal emotions” such as anger or love163 and when the 
behavior is observable and public.
164
  In our context, identity signaling by novel families can 
have this effect. For example, consider the narratives of committed gay and lesbian couples, 
often with their children, that became familiar during the campaign to extend marriage rights to 
these couples.
165
 Berger’s research suggests that these positive images may have played a key 
role in generating relatively rapid changes in public attitudes. 
The process of identity signaling does not proceed seamlessly: it imposes costs on 
polygamous families, especially in the early period. Successful signaling and normative 
integration depends on families’ willingness to sacrifice some privacy, as public familiarity and 
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 Once these outsiders adopt the family-behavior signal, the normative meaning of a family itself may evolve. In 
other words, as the social change occurs, the set of socially accepted family behavior expands to include the unique 
means of cementing commitment that the novel group has developed. Berger, Identity Signaling, supra note – at 
183-4. Thomas Stoddard argued that extending marriage rights to gays and lesbians would positively influence the 
meaning of marriage. Stoddard, supra note _ at 14.   
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 Of course, it is possible that the signaling will not be effective and public awareness of polygamous families will 
be lead to alarm accompanied by public hostility.  
161
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Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, supra note – at 909, and McAdams, supra note – at 365-72. Economists 
have studied similar phenomena as well, focusing on bandwagon effects, herd behavior and information cascades.  
See e.g., A.V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q. J. Econ. 797 (1992); W. Bikchandani, D. 
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 Jonah Berger & Katherine Milkman, What Makes Online Content Viral, 49 J. Marketing Res. 192 (2012). 
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 For a discussion of the role of social influence, see NICHOLAS A CHRISTAKIS & JAMES FOWLER, CONNECTED:  
THE SURPRISING POWER OF OUR SOCIAL NETWORKS AND HOW THEY SHAPE OUR LIVES (2009). 
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 See discussion in Part IIIA infra.  
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acceptance can only happen if polygamous families are open about their relationships. To 
varying degrees, identity signaling exposes the family to the risk of negative public reactions, 
ranging from curiosity and skepticism to hostility and outrage. For some novel families 
(including polygamous families), the costs are likely to be high, including the risk of criminal 
sanctions for living together as families.
166
  Predictably, aspiring families will be reluctant to 
incur onerous costs. In this situation, some exogenous shock that increase costs on continuing 
their closeted lives may serve as a catalyst, motivating novel families to bear the initial costs of 
living openly.
167
 Over time, as the public becomes familiar with the nature of novel family 
relationships, the hope is that acceptance grows and hostility dissipates.  
*   *   * 
Although our model proceeds in three discrete stages for analytical purposes, the 
collaborative process through which polygamous families seek to gain public acceptance 
overlaps substantially with the group’s effort to attain legal recognition. First as we have 
discussed, novel families and their advocates pursue their legal goals in part by signaling their 
identity with established families, assuring the public about the quality of their relationships. 
Second, as we discuss below, regulators are likely to extend legal protections through an 
incremental process that allows state actors to gain information about the aspiring family 
category.  The incremental extension of legal rights has feedback effects that also contribute to 
public familiarity and acceptance, while at the same time minimizing backlash that might follow 
from full recognition of unfamiliar groups.
168
 Moreover, legal recognition in itself powerfully 
signals legitimacy that, in turn, contributes to growing public acceptance of novel families.
169
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CLOSET TO THE ALTAR, supra note _(describing backlash to early cases extending marriage rights to gay couples)  
169
 This interaction has been widely studied by scholars examining the expressive function of the law. Larry Lessig 
has shown that the state, if sensitive to social meaning of particular behaviors, can stimulate desired changes through 
legal expression. See e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev.943, 964-73 
(1996).  Cass Sunstein extended Lessig’s analysis by analyzing how legal regulation can affect normative structures 
as well. Sunstein suggested that antilittering statutes have such an expressive effect. Sunstein, The Expressive 
Function of Law, supra note – at 2026-35. These changes in preferences and values occur because the social 
meaning of these behaviors has been changed.  Thereafter a norm cascade can result through the stimulation of 
individual preferences being changed by the legal regulation. Id.  See also McAdams, supra note – at 355-66 
(arguing that law can change behavior by signaling a consensus that is only dimly perceived by the larger 
 42 
4.  Resolving the Verifiability Problem through Collaborative Regulation 
 a. Legal Certification to Guard against Uncertain Risks.  Even if the novel family 
category gains social tolerance or acceptance (and success is certainly not guaranteed), the state 
independently has an interest in verifying that these groups will function effectively for all of 
members before it certifies the category as a legal family. But here the state faces a significant 
information problem: family behavior is private and thus resists efforts to verify the quality of 
family functioning, especially when (as with polygamous families) there is little by way of 
historic experience. Some types may appear to perform family functions satisfactorily but create 
latent risks affecting some members that are not immediately apparent. For example, 
polygamous family groups may appear to provide care and support to members harmoniously, 
but experience over time might reveal difficulties maintaining equality norms and avoiding 
exploitation.
170
  (Indeed, it is plausible that groups lacking the qualities of well-functioning 
families might organize to pursue social acceptance and legal recognition through fraudulent 
means, a stratagem that time likely would reveal.
171
) Time might also reveal that conjugality 
serves a key bonding function for unrelated adults and, as a consequence, intergenerational and 
voluntary kin groups may turn out to be fragile, thereby jeopardizing dependent members.
172
  To 
be sure, these particular risks may not materialize, but the general point is that the state will 
demand sufficient information to mitigate latent risks as part of the process of determining 
whether a novel family category should receive family status and the societal benefits and 
resources that follow.
173
  The network of polygamous families, in turn, has an interest in 
providing information that assures the state that this category meets the state’s expectations for 
family functioning.  
 Several challenges may arise. Some aspiring groups may deserve legal recognition as 
fulfilling family functions but be difficult to evaluate because they are based on unconventional 
commitments or appear to be continuing the process of evolution. Other groups may face 
                                                                                                                                                                           
community) and discussion in note _ infra. For a review and critique of this literature, see Scott, The Limits of 
Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, supra note – at 1623-30.  
170
 The risk of coercion and exploitation may be as great in dyadic relationships  
171
 Several readers suggested this possibility, as a component of the political economy story. For example, 
fundamentalist polygamists could influence public opinion by masking their undesirable qualities and falsely 
signaling that their relationships were reformed.   
172
 Of course, non-conjugal unions avoid the destabilizing threat of infidelity.  
173
 See discussion Part IIIC infra.  
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unusual political obstacles, despite their apparently effective functioning, that impede full 
recognition as families. Thus, the state must seek to understand the context in which the aspiring 
family group functions; in doing so, lawmakers are likely to proceed with caution, perceiving 
that once rights are extended, they will be difficult to withdraw.  For some groups, an iterative 
process may be appropriate, one in which the legal rights and responsibilities are assigned 
incrementally, allowing the state to monitor family functioning over time in the process of 
certifying family status.
174
  For other aspiring family categories, particularly those that are truly 
novel, a collaborative approach may also require joint efforts by the state and the group to 
establish a standard of best practices that are policed informally by the network itself.    
b. An Iterative Approach. The state can verify and certify the family status of an aspiring 
family type in several ways, including judicial recognition on constitutional grounds, state 
legislative enactments, and administrative regulation. For some family groups, such as 
cohabiting couples or (perhaps) multigenerational groups, the risk of exploitation and instability 
may be relatively modest because the aspiring family is modeled on a familiar form.  For these 
groups, full family status can be attained through a straightforward iterative process, with rights 
and obligations extended to the group incrementally.
175
 Through this collaborative process, state 
actors acquire information informally about the quality of the family commitments over time, 
allowing the state to verify that family functions are being performed satisfactorily.
176
 For 
example, if the state creates a family status with some relationship rights and privileges, it can 
acquire information comparing dissolution rates to divorce rates.
177
  Moreover, the iterative 
process may have a feedback effect, with the limited family status expediting public acceptance 
of the novel group as “real” families.  Eventually, the state’s monitoring function recedes as the 
                                                     
174
 Several scholars, often drawing on the experience in some European countries, have argued that the path to 
marriage equality for gay couples is a step by step process. William Eskridge has argued that a “step-by-step 
approach to the extension of marriage rights for gay couples was important to increase public acceptance. WILLIAM 
ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 115-118 (2002) (arguing that 
a step-by-step legal process is a means to changing public attitudes).  For a contrary view, see Erez Aloni, 
Incrementalism, Civil Unions, and the Possibility of Predicting Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 18 Duke 
J. of Gender L. and Policy 105 (2010).  
175
  For a discussion of the key features of public-private collaborations, see Charles F. Sabel & William F. Simon, 
Contextualizing Regimes:  Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 
110 Mich. L. Rev. 1265, --- (2012). 
176
 See Part IIIA for a discussion of how relationship rights have been extended incrementally to gay and lesbian 
couples, culminating in the right to marry.    
177
 See discussion in Part IIIA of the iterative process through which gay couples obtained marriage equality rights, 
first through limited domestic partnership laws and then civil union statutes..  
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new family category stabilizes and ultimately attains full legal recognition. This iterative process 
provides greater certainty for the parties and for third parties dealing with the new families and 
enhances the privacy and freedom of individual members of the recognized category to pursue 
their relationship goals without external monitoring.
178
  
c. Joint Mitigation of Risks through “Best Practices” Collaboration.   For novel groups 
that pose substantial informational and\or political challenges, the state may require a more 
formal collaborative process in conjunction with an iterative approach.  For polygamous family 
groups, for example, uncertainty is high because there are no models for family behavior or 
tested responses to the possible risks that may arise from certification of the group.  In this case, 
the state may turn to a more interactive collaboration to enunciate and enforce “best practices” 
that mitigate those risks. Here the goal is to encourage common efforts by the polygamous 
families themselves to create binding commitments that minimize the risk of perceived harm.  
Once again we invoke a commercial analogue—one that at first blush may seem quite 
remote from the realm of novel families.  Leafy green vegetables pose particular risks because 
they are often eaten raw and, today,  often sold in “salad mixes” that mingle greens picked in 
different locations, thus expanding the possibilities for cross contamination.
179
 Following an 
outbreak of illness, California designated an authority to establish safety standards or “best 
practices” for the farms from which member handlers buy.180 These standards require growers 
and processors to identify hazardous control points and report the measures undertaken to 
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 Mary Anne Case argues that the licensing of marriage protects couples’ privacy from government intrusion in 
ways not available couples in domestic partnerships.  Once a couple marries, they can have separate bank accounts, 
live apart etc., whereas domestic partners must provide evidence of marriage-like behavior to establish their status. 
Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1758, 1772-76 (2004-2005). The same freedom would be 
enjoyed by novel families once the new category is recognized.  
179
 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contract and Innovation, supra note – at 211-212. All actors in the food supply chain 
have an interest in protecting their market by developing a regime of practices that reduce the chances for 
contamination and limit its effect. The state, as the protector of public health, has complementary interests. Id  at 
212-213. 
180
  The authority was delegated to a Board established by the Leafy Green Product Handlers Agreement (LGMA).  
State of Cal. Dep’t of Food & Agric., California Leafy Green Products Handler Marketing Agreement (effective as 
amended from Mar. 5, 2008) [hereinafter California Marketing Agreement], available at 
http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/mkt/mkt/pdf/CA%20Leafy%20Green%20Products%20Handler%20Agreement.pd. LGMA 
is governed by a thirteen-member board, chosen by the state Secretary of Agriculture from nominations by the 
membership. Twelve must be representatives of the handler-members of the organization; the thirteenth is supposed 
to represent “the public.” California Marketing Agreement, id. at art. III. 
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mitigate the hazard.
181
  Inspectors from the California Department of Food and Agriculture 
monitor compliance,
182
 but the ultimate sanction for noncompliance is suspension or withdrawal 
of a recalcitrant member’s right to use a service mark, and thus temporary or permanent 
exclusion from the industry is enforced informally.
183
  
The success of this “best practices” approach offers a regulatory prototype for the 
mitigation of harms from legal recognition of some categories of novel families where a more 
formal process of information-sharing and monitoring is warranted. Such a collaboration has 
four key elements: 1) creation of a formal association of aspiring families in the high-risk group; 
2) information exchange between the group (or its representatives) and the state to establish best 
practices; 3) monitoring by the state to ensure that the group complies with those practices; and 
4) informal enforcement by the association through shaming or exclusion.
184
  In the case of 
polygamous families, risks that might attend the recognition of multiple-party family types 
include the exploitation of minors and other “minority” interests or harms caused by instability 
of the family relationships.  Problems such as these can be addressed through a collaborative 
process in which the aspiring families provide information to the state about the context in which 
they fulfill their family functions, the parties collectively establish benchmarks that embody their 
expectations for the support and care of all family members, and the families collectively seek to 
promote compliance with the benchmarks.
185
 Through mechanisms such as this, the state, as it 
incrementally extends rights, can certify well-functioning family categories subject to a 
regulatory scheme tailored to their needs but serving the general goals of facilitating well-
functioning family relationships. Thereafter, as with marriage, deference to family privacy will 
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 The LGMA additionally requires each handler to maintain records that permit identification of the farm and field 
from which all components of its products originate in case contamination is later discovered.  California Marketing 
Agreement, supra note --, art. V. See generally, Cal. Leafy Green Prods. Handler Mktg. Bd., Commodity Specific 
Food Safety Guidelines for the Production and Harvest of Lettuce and Leafy Greens (Jul. 22, 2011, available at 
http://www.caleafygreens.ca.gov/sites/default/files/LGMA%20Accepted%20Food%20Safety%20Practices%207.22.
11.pdf. (provisions that impose record-keeping requirements on signatory handlers). 
182
 Id. 
183
 The handler members, in turn, commit to deal only with farms that comply with the standards. California Leafy 
Greens Handler Marketing Agreement, (Jan. 27, 2007) available at 
www.caff.org/policy/documents/lgph_agreement.pdf.  There are other private standard setting and certification 
regimes, such as GlobalGAP (for “good agricultural practices”), an organization formed by major European 
retailers; and a private international organization, the Global Food Safety Initiative assesses certification regimes in 
accordance with a set of meta-standards.   
184
 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, Contract and Innovation, supra note – at 210-213. 
185
 In Part IIIC, we discuss how polygamous groups can adopt a best practices regulatory framework.  
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translate into minimal state involvement for any individual family that is licensed so long as the 
family is intact.  
d. The licensing of individual families. Once a novel family type is certified, a 
registration or licensing system, analogous to marriage licensing, provides a means by which 
individual families in the novel type can obtain the formal status.  This mechanism sets out 
simple, clear rules that authorize licensing of all families that qualify under the certified 
category. The registration process has a number of benefits: It provides public acknowledgment 
of qualifying family categories, signaling that recognized relationships fulfill important social 
functions. Further, registration embodies commitment in a concrete form, reinforcing family 
commitment norms.
186
  Licensing is also a means by which the legal obligations and rights that 
attend the status are clearly defined and assigned, providing security and certainty to family 
members through post-dissolution enforcement with modest administrative and judicial costs.
187
 
For example, if formal family status confers on polygamous families a right to share property 
with other family members as it does for married couples, individual families by registering can 
avoid difficult proof problems that are likely to accompany contractual enforcement.
188
 
Registration reduces the risk that exploitative individuals will succeed in enjoying the benefits of 
family relationships while avoiding reciprocal obligations (as sometimes happens in informal 
unions).
189
  Finally, and importantly, a formal licensing process protects family privacy by 
avoiding intrusive inquiries to determine whether an individual family embodies the qualities 
that justify family status, another cost that informal families must bear.
190
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 The public signal of family status reinforces social norms by resolving any uncertainty the community may have 
had about the nature of the relationship. 
187
  Licensing avoids error and administrative costs that regulators face when they seek to evaluate individually the 
claims of informal aspiring families. It also protects family privacy. See note 188 infra.  
188
 See Elizabeth Scott, Implied Contracts, supra note _ at_ (describing the difficult proof problems faced by 
partners in informal unions seeking to enforce contractual understandings).  See also Ira Ellman, Contract Thinking  
was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1365 (2001)(describing poor enforcement). 
189
 Id. The ALI Domestic Partnership status creates marriage-like obligations between long time cohabitants, but has 
not been adopted by American states. ALI, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION SECT. 6:06-6.06 
(2000). See also Robin Fretwell Wilson and Michael Clisham, American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principle or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 Fam. L.Q. 573, 590 
(2008) (describing failure of states to adopt ALI Domestic Partnership Principles). Some European countries, as well 
as Canada and Australia, have sought to mitigate these problems by expanding legal protection to cohabitants and 
their children. SEE POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE, at 111-120, supra note --.    
190
 When parties in non-marital families seek legal recognition of their family status, an individualized inquiry often 
requires parties to provide decision-makers with intimate information about their relationship, living arrangements 
and intentions. See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 213 (1989) (supporting the judgment with 
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*  *  * 
One challenge to the iterative approach we propose is that the evolutionary process 
toward full legal protection could have the effect of limiting the options for family formation if 
fully licensed families supplant other less comprehensive forms. In this vein, marriage critics 
have expressed concern that same-sex couples will be channeled into marriage as an exclusive 
status that crowds out other forms of legal protection.
191
  We acknowledge this risk but, as 
suggested below, we do not think that the iterative approach necessarily is incompatible with 
policies of recognizing more limited family relationships.
192
    
   
III. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: THE WAY FORWARD FOR NEW FAMILIES 
The model developed in Part II describes in stylized terms the discrete stages of an 
evolutionary process by which novel family groups can use collaborative techniques to overcome 
the uncertainty that otherwise impedes legal recognition.  In this Part, we turn our attention to 
real world contexts in which the stages of relational novelty, isolation and non-verifiability are 
largely overlapping and thus less sharply delineated.  In Part IIIA, we show how the movement 
toward recognition of marriage rights for gay and lesbian couples has successfully deployed 
collaborative strategies in an evolutionary process that is broadly consistent with  the model we 
describe in Part II.
193
  Part IIIB examines, in contrast, the somewhat puzzling failure of families 
                                                                                                                                                                           
evidence of the parties’ living arrangements over time, daily schedules, joint bank accounts, life insurance policy 
beneficiaries, in addition to other typically private information).  In contrast, the acquisition of a marriage license 
automatically confers the rights and obligations of family status and allows the defines the group freedom to arrange 
their lives as they wish without oversight and monitoring by the state. See Case, Marriage Licenses, supra note _ 
(pointing out the freedom that married couples enjoy). Marital obligations are not formally enforced in intact 
relationships, but provide the basis for property division and support after divorce. Presumably the same approach 
would be applied to other registered families.  
191
 See e.g. Katherine Franke, Marriage is a Mixed Blessing, NY Times, June 23, 2011(op ed arguing that New 
York’s recognition of same-sex marriage may lead to abolition of domestic partnership status and rights of de facto 
family members).  
192
 See discussion of options for limited family status, such as Colorado Designated Beneficiaries statute, in Part 
IIIC2b infra. 
193
 Of course, ours is one of many possible accounts of the marriage equality movement. Constitutional law scholars 
have focused on the impact of the LGBT social movement on constitutional culture. See Jack Balkin and Reva 
Siegel, Principles, Practices and Social Movements, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 927, 948 (explaining how the LGBT social 
movement challenged settled constitutional practices as violating anti-discrimination principle ); William Eskridge, 
Channeling: Identity-based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. Pa. L. Rev. 419 (2001)(describing politics of 
recognition through which gays and lesbians (and other identity groups) employ equal protection principle to gain 
majority rights). 
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based on informal cohabitation to attain legal recognition. We suggest that the complexity and 
variety of these relationships pose daunting information problems that have inhibited 
collaborative affiliation, normative integration and legal recognition. In Part IIIC, we focus on 
relationships not involving dyadic intimate pairs, including polyamorous, multi-generational and 
voluntary kin groups. These aspiring family groups cannot be measured as readily against the 
template provided by marriage. Thus, they pose more complex governance issues than does the 
standard two-party union, and that may create challenges for the state in evaluating family 
functioning. The collaborative framework we developed in Part II highlights both the challenges 
and the opportunities for achieving a legal status facing these truly novel family forms.  
A. SAME-SEX FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: FROM OUTLAW TO MAINSTREAM 
The modern history of gay and lesbian family relationships conforms roughly to our 
account of how a novel family category evolves from outsider status to full integration and legal 
recognition.
194
 Through the 1980s and well beyond, many (perhaps most) gays were closeted, 
hiding their sexual orientation and intimate relationships from family, friends and colleagues to 
avoid harsh social and legal sanctions.  But even in this hostile environment, couples cohabited 
in long-term unions
195
 and developed clear understandings of their mutual obligations.
196
  Same-
sex couples in committed relationships began to execute contracts to formalize their 
understandings regarding property sharing, support, inheritance and related issues.
197
  Over time  
                                                     
194
 To be sure, the path to recognition of marriage rights for LGBT couples does not precisely follow the stylized 
three-stage process we describe. But the overall pattern largely tracks the course we describe.  Two landmark 
Supreme Court decisions dramatically mark the change in status we describe. In 1986, the Supreme Court in Bowers 
v. Hardwick upheld the constitutionality of a state statute criminalizing the sexual intimacy between gay men. 478 
U.S. 186 (1986). Twenty seven years later, In United States v. Windsor, the Court struck down Section 3 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act on the ground that excluding same-sex couples married under state law from the federal 
definition of marriage offended the dignity of their relationships. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
195
 MARY MENDOLA, THE MENDOLA REPORT: A NEW LOOK AT GAY COUPLES (1980) (recounting survey of 
hundreds of same-sex couples in the 70s and 80s). See also e.g., Anne Hull "Just Married, After 51 Years Together; 
Activist Gay Couple Accepts Leading Role." WASH. POST., Feb 29, 2004. p. A.01 (describing life of gay couple 
together for over 50 years); Glenn Chapman, Being Gay in America: a 50-year Love Story AFP, available at 
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iBphZRCRncTYPkQT_xk9K-
seegng?docId=CNG.feaf99808e07209bf669127e7046e006.bd1 (May 8, 2014)(same). 
196
 George Chauncey’s history of the movement describes gay partners exchanging vows in marriage ceremonies 
performed in the Metropolitan Community Church in the 1970s and 1980s. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? 
THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY’S DEBATE OVER GAY EQUALITY  91-92 (2004).  
197
 See, e.g., Whorton v. Dillingham, 202 Cal.App.3d 447 (App. Dist. 1988) (upholding oral contract between same-
sex partners in which one promised to provide financial support in exchange for emotional support and household 
services); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding written agreement between 
same-sex partners); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 784 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Sup. Ct. 2004) (upholding agreement between 
same-sex partners that decided division of property upon termination of relationship).   
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these couples and their advocates, motivated by a common goal of attaining respect and legal 
protection for their relationships, increasingly formed networks through their social, political and 
religious affiliations.
198
  This movement contributed to greater openness about sexual orientation, 
stimulated media interest and increased public familiarity with, and acceptance of, same-sex 
family relationships.  In recent years, advocates have sought and won legal recognition of these 
unions through an incremental process, culminating in the largely successful (and ongoing) effort 
to obtain marriage rights.   
1. Contract and Commitment.  
Throughout the 20
th
 century, gays and lesbians faced intense public animus.  Until quite 
recently, polls showed that most Americans thought same-sex intimacy was immoral;
199
 social 
and religious conservatives in the 1980s even suggested that AIDS was God’s punishment for 
sinful behavior.
200
  Some states had criminal anti-sodomy statutes aimed at gays, until these laws 
were ruled unconstitutional in 2003.
201
  Discrimination in employment, housing and education 
was rampant and gays and lesbians received little protection under anti-discrimination laws.
202
 
Not surprisingly, in this environment many LGBT individuals chose not to publicize their sexual 
orientation or their intimate relationships, a stance that in many settings prevailed into the 21
st
 
century.  
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 The movement from isolation to broad societal acceptance is generally seen as starting in the 1950s with the 
Mattachine Society, a group of gay men in Los Angeles who wanted to create social acceptance for LGB people. 
JAMES T. STEARS, BEHIND THE MASK OF THE MATTACHINE 147 (2006). Disagreements within the group about what 
methods should be used eventually led the group to disband. C. TODD WHITE, PRE-GAY L.A. 18–19 (2009) 
(discussing initial disagreement about purpose and mission of Mattachine). The modern LGBT rights movement is 
then seen as having started with the Stonewall riots in 1969. SAM DEADERICK & TAMARA TURNER, GAY 
RESISTANCE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY 39–40 (1997). 
199
 From the 1970s to the early 1990s, polls showed that between two thirds and three quarters of Americans thought 
gay sexual relations were “always wrong.” That percentage dropped to 44% by 2010. Tom Smith, Public Attitudes 
toward Homosexuality, Nat’l Opinion Research Center (2011) at  www.norc.org M. Jones, Americans' Opposition to 
Gay Marriage Eases Slightly, Gallup Politics (May 24, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/128291/americans-
opposition-gay-marriage-eases-slightly.aspx. 
200
 Hans Johnson & William Eskridge, The Legacy of Falwell’s Bully Pulpit—A Commentary by William Eskridge 
’78 (last visited 4/19/2014, 11:05 AM), http://www.law.yale.edu/news/5131.htm. 
201
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down Texas sodomy ban as unconstitutional). Some states still 
have these laws in their criminal codes, but do not enforce them against consenting adults. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. 
§ § 18.2-361 (2005). 
202
 The first nondiscrimination law for LGBT people was passed in Massachusetts in 1981; the next was passed 8 
years later. David E. Newton, Same-Sex Marriage : A Reference Handbook 21 (2010), available at 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/columbia//docDetail.action?docID=10437171. These laws generated strong opposition and 
efforts to repeal. Ultimately the Supreme Court intervenes in Romer v. Evans to prevent repeal of these laws. 517 
U.S. 620 (1996). 
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Despite this hostile climate, many gays and lesbians found partners and cohabited in stable 
unions in the last decades of the 20
th
 century.
203
  Functioning in isolation from the larger society, 
and often from family, friends and colleagues, same-sex couples constructed their relationships 
in a highly uncertain environment in which they lacked legal protection and often social support.  
The evidence suggests that many same-sex couples had clear understandings of their mutual 
obligations to care for and support one another, and to share income and property. Despite 
stresses unfamiliar to straight couples, these couples were able to sustain stable relationships on 
the basis of these understandings,
204
 Some couples in supportive communities signaled their 
marriage-like commitment to one another through wedding ceremonies
205
 even though neither 
regulators nor (often) family recognized their commitments.
206
  
The understandings of same-sex gay couples in committed relationships during this period 
can be seen as analogous to collaborative agreements in the business setting.  These early 
cohabitation agreements were experimental endeavors worked out under conditions of high 
uncertainty.  In this environment, collaborative commitments served to guide normative behavior 
and to build the trust and confidence that reinforces committed relationships.  But even couples 
who exchanged marriage vows well understood that their commitments were not legally 
enforceable. By the 1990s, however, courts began to apply equitable remedies in cases where 
one partner had exploited the other in a grossly unfair manner. Thus, for example, some courts 
imposed constructive trusts on property held in legal title by one cohabitant where the other had 
invested large amounts on improvements in reliance on the relational understanding.
207
 These 
judicial responses resemble the limited enforcement of collaborative contracts by courts seeking 
to deter blatant cheating on the commitment to collaborate. 
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 Many relationships have become familiar through litigation, the media and historical accounts and cases. See, 
e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (holding multi-decade lesbian relationship must be recognized 
under federal law); Glenn Chapman, supra note -- (describing fifty year relationship); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & 
DARREN R. SPEDALE, GAY MARRIAGE: FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE? 251 (2006) (describing 40 year relationship of 
Jack Baker and Mike McConnell) ; Braschi v Stahl Assoc., supra note  -- (11 years).    
204
 Id. See also generally MENDOLA, supra note -- (providing in-depth qualitative interviews with same-sex couples).  
205
See note _ infra.   
206
See CHAUNCEY, supra note -- at 99 (discussing pattern during AIDS crisis of hospitals and regulators favoring 
biological family of LGBT patient over partners without legal relationship). See also, e.g., In re Guardianship of 
Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) Kowalski was prevented from seeing her partner injured in a 
severe car accident by her partner’s family for several years, until a Minnesota appeals court found her to be the 
lawful guardian of her partner.   
207
 See, e.g., Cannisi v. Walsh, 831 N.Y.S.2d 352 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (holding lesbian partner “articulated a 
colorable claim for a constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale of the subject property”).  
 51 
Over time, as our collaborative model predicts, some cohabiting couples began to execute 
formal agreements creating mutually enforceable property rights.  Although courts first enforced 
agreements between cohabitants in the 1970s, few early cases involved same-sex couples. But by 
the 1990s, courts began to enforce contracts between gay and lesbian partners that specified 
mutual financial obligations and understandings.
208
  Indeed, cohabiting same-sex couples 
probably were (and are) more likely to execute formal contracts than their straight counterparts 
because contract provided the only means by which same-sex couples could secure some of the 
rights and obligations that automatically follow from marital status.
209
  
2.  Political Action, Public Acceptance and Normative Integration. 
By the 1980s and 1990s, the number of lesbian and gay families increased and the need for 
legal protection and political advocacy became more pressing. Scholars agree that two 
developments during this period -- the AIDS epidemic and the lesbian baby boom -- motivated 
social and political actions that had far-reaching consequences.
210
 A critically important element 
of this process was the formation of networks by couples and advocates aiming to promote the 
rights of couples in same-sex relationships, in part through strategies that increased acceptance of 
gay and lesbian family life in the larger society. 211 
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 See e.g., Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1094 (R.I. 2002) (“[I]t is not illegal for two men to live together, much 
less to contract and to enter into partnerships with each other while doing so.”) See also cases cited in note ---, supra.  
209
 Couples who are not able to marry or enter civil unions frequently execute contracts regarding support, property 
sharing, inheritance, custody rights, guardianship and other matters. Although estimating the number of such 
agreements is speculative, in 1995, it was estimated that 10% of same-sex couples had written relationships 
agreements. Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic Partnership and Default Rules at 278, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY,   
supra note _(reporting study). Some websites and legal documents encourage same-sex couples to execute written 
agreements, especially in states where they lack other means of legal formalization. See, e.g., Model Cohabitation 
Agreement for Domestic Partners, http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/estate-elder/b/estate-elder-
blog/archive/2010/10/05/model-cohabitation-agreement-for-domestic-partners.aspx (Oct. 5, 2010 10:31 AM); See 
HRC Sample Domestic Partnership Agreement, available at http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources 
/Domestic_Partner_Agreement.pdf [on file with the authors].  Even where gay couples marry or enter civil unions, 
they may execute contracts out of concern that other states will not recognize their status. See generally Karel Raba, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Out-of-State Adoption Decrees Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause: The Case 
of Supplemental Birth Certificates, 15 Scholar: St. Mary's L. Rev. & Soc. Just. 293 (2013).  
210
 George Chauncey identifies the AIDS epidemic and the lesbian baby boom as the key catalysts stimulating the 
marriage movement, CHAUNCEY, supra note -- at 95-111.  See also NeJaime, supra note – at 102 (“The HIV/AIDS 
epidemic brought countless gay men out of the closet, united lesbians and gay men behind a common cause, and 
profoundly shaped the organization of the LGBT movement.”). 
211
 See CHAUNCEY, supra note -- at 41- 42 and 47(describing mobilization of gays, with large numbers coming out to 
friends, workmates and families in the late 1980s and 1990s).  David E. Newton, Same-Sex Marriage : A Reference 
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The AIDS epidemic was a traumatic, exogenous shock that played a powerful role in 
triggering the process of social and legal reform because it provided stark evidence of the 
vulnerability of committed same-sex relationships when partners were required to engage with 
society’s institutions.  First, AIDS patients who lost their health insurance because they were too 
ill to work were not eligible for family coverage on their partners’ plans.212 Moreover, when gay 
and lesbian individuals contracted AIDS (or, indeed any serious illness or disability
213
), their 
partners often were prevented from participating in treatment decisions,  acting as proxy medical 
decision-makers, or even from planning funerals and memorial services, often despite decedents’ 
express wishes.
214
  Surviving gay partners had no inheritance rights; in the absence of a will (and 
sometimes even with one), parents, siblings and even more remote relatives acquired the 
deceased partner’s property.215  In response to the plight of patients and their partners, the gay 
and lesbian community rallied, uniting in ways that reinforced its cohesiveness, and an energized 
corps of legal advocates mobilized to assert their rights.
216
 The AIDS crisis effectively motivated 
collective action and provided a foundation for a powerful interest group aimed at gaining 
protection of same-sex couples’ family rights.  Despite the onerous cost of living openly, the 
stakes had become sufficiently high that more couples were willing to take the risk. 
In the last decades of the 20
th
 century, this drive for legal protection gained momentum from 
another source as well. Lesbian (and some gay) couples began to form families and to have and 
raise children, usually biologically related to one partner and often produced through sperm 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Handbook 23 (2010), available at http://site.ebrary.com/lib/columbia//docDetail.action?docID=10437171 (noting 
the growth of LGBT organizations in the 1980s, leading to the emergence of the marriage movement ). 
212
 See Chauncey, supra note 234 at _. 
213
 The case of Sharon Kowalski, supra note -- also had a galvanizing impact, as it made clear how little protection 
gay partnerships had. See CHAUNCEY, supra note -- at 111-116.  
214
 William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of Lesbian and Gay 
Relationships, 8 J.L. & Pol. 91 (1991-1992) (“AIDS has made the lack of a legal relationship crushingly apparent to 
lesbian and gay couples: a gay man whose partner is dying of AIDS may have difficulty inquiring about his 
condition or visiting him in the hospital because the couple has no legal relationship to one another.”). 
215
 See, e.g., Matter of Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (1993) (rejecting same-sex partner’s claim to be “surviving 
spouse” for the purpose of inheritance). 
216
 See CHAUNCEY, supra note -- at 41-42. See also Tina Fetner, How the Religious Right Shaped Lesbian and Gay 
Activism 55 –56 (2008), available at http://site.ebrary.com/lib/columbia//docDetail.action?docID=10274273. 
(“Lesbians, though not afflicted by AIDS in large numbers, were on the front lines of [AIDS response]. . . . In 
dealing with this tragedy, the gay and lesbian community . . . established close networks of organizations working 
toward common causes.”).  
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donation (or surrogacy arrangements).
217
  This trend in itself indicated the growing desire of 
same-sex couples to live together in committed family relationships, that of necessity could not 
function in complete privacy. But these families faced daunting legal challenges unknown to 
different-sex couples. The partner who lacked a biological connection with the child enjoyed no 
parental rights.
218
 If the legal parent died or became incapacitated, her parents or other relatives 
were likely to gain custody; despite having lived for years in a parent-child relationship, the 
partner became a legal stranger to the child.
219
 Further, if the parents separated, the non-
biological parent’s relationship with her children continued only with the consent of her former 
partner.
220
 Even biological parents lacked secure parental rights as courts in some states were 
prepared to find lesbians to be unfit parents on the basis of their sexual orientation.
 221
  
The growing interest among gays and lesbians in forming family relationships, together with 
increased awareness of how vulnerable these relationships were, became a catalyst for collective 
action, conforming roughly to the collaborative processes we describe in Part II. During the last 
decades of the 20
th
 century, same-sex couples increasingly affiliated through social, political and 
religious networks, strengthening bonds within the gay community.
222
  Commitment ceremonies 
grew in popularity and religious couples underwent non-legal marriage ceremonies before 
friends and family in supportive churches.
223
 Committed same-sex couples, together with their 
children, formed the basis of a normative community of families that provided social support to 
one another.
224
  Particularly with the abolition of anti-sodomy laws criminalizing same-sex 
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  Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological 
Lesbian Coparents, 50 Buff. L. Rev. 341, 391 n.2 (2002) (citing report that as many as ten million children in the 
U.S. live in families with same-sex parents). 
218
 Id. at _. 
219
 Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (1993) (observing that mother’s partner’s custodial claim was 
vulnerable, should mother die, even  though mother designated her as child’s guardian in her will); T.F. v. B.L., 813 
N.E.2d 1244, 1254 (2004) (rejecting custodial claim of former female partner of biological mother with no 
biological relationship to the child). 
220
 Jacobs, supra note _ at _.  
221
  Divorced or unmarried custodial mothers were vulnerable to challenges by fathers or other relatives claiming 
that lesbian mothers were unfit. In a much publicized Virginia case, Sharon Bottoms, a lesbian mother, lost custody 
to her mother. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 108 (1995) (awarding custody to grandmother on ground that 
“conduct inherent in [mother’s] lesbianism is punishable as a Class 6 felony in the Commonwealth..”)  
222
 See discussion of role of AIDS crisis in promoting network formation among gays, supra notes -- to --.   
223
 See Chauncey, supra note _ at 91-92;  James N. Birkitt, MCC & Marriage Equality, Metropolitan Community 
Churches (last visited May 8, 2014), http://mccchurch.org/overview/history-of-mcc/mcc-and-marriage-equality/ 
(describing early Metropolitan Community Church marriage ceremonies).   
224
 See AMANDA K. BAUMLE ET AL., SAME-SEX PARTNERS 84–91 (2009) (discussing reasons that LGBT people 
interact and may choose to live in predominantly LGBT neighborhoods). The formation of social community began 
even before the catalyst of the AIDS crisis triggered a more activist approach.  See e.g. Katherine Turk, "Our 
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intimacy,
225
 these families also began to live more openly in their communities and had more 
interaction with straight neighbors, teachers, and others, who thus could observe their 
conventional character.
226
   
The common goal of securing legal protection for gay and lesbian family relationships was 
critically important at several levels.  First, it served to reinforce cohesiveness within the gay 
community, with a growing network of same-sex couples and their legal and political advocates 
collaborating on a common set of political and social objectives.
227
  As with the formation of 
collaborative business networks, this network was supported by the shared goals and common 
purposes of its members.  A norm of cooperation and open exchange of information among 
network members was essential to the effective pursuit of legal reform.  But the evidence 
suggests that the reform movement served as well to solidify family commitment norms. 
Beginning in the 1980s with the effort to persuade localities to pass domestic partnership 
ordinances offering limited protection to gay couples, the clear strategy of the advocates who 
emerged to lead the political and legal movement (the norm entrepreneurs) was to define the 
relationships of same-sex couples as being like marriage and not like those of different-sex 
couples who chose not to marry:
228
  Advocates described same-sex couples seeking relationship 
recognition as being in committed, financially dependent unions like their married counterparts.  
Thus, the state’s decision to exclude these couples from benefits that married couples enjoyed 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Militancy Is in Our Openness": Gay Employment Rights Activism in California and the Question of Sexual 
Orientation in Sex Equality Law, 31 Law & Hist. Rev. 423, 432–33 (2013) (describing the early formation of social 
networks among gays and lesbians, together with organizations such as the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of 
Bilitis in the 1950s). See discussion in note _ supra.  
225
 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)(finding criminal statute prohibiting sodomy unconstitutional). 
226
 Much evidence supports that positive attitudes follow when straights have personal association with gays. See 
discussion in note 233 infra. Surveys show that after 2000, the percentage of the population that had personal 
relationships with gays increased dramatically.   
227
 See Fetner, supra note -- at 46.  
228
 Douglas NeJaime, supra note _ makes this point in describing the strategy of advocates seeking to acquire 
domestic partnership status for same-sex couples in Los Angeles and San Francisco in the 1990s:  
 
“[T]o achieve nonmarital recognition, advocates appealed to marriage's conventions, pointed to the unique 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, and stressed same-sex couples' commonality with married 
couples. In building domestic partnership, they emphasized marital norms–such as adult romantic 
affiliation, mutual emotional commitment, and economic interdependence–capable of including same-sex 
couples. By challenging marriage's primacy while arguing for recognition in terms defined by marital 
norms, advocates contested, accepted, and ultimately shaped the institution of marriage while 
simultaneously portraying same-sex relationships as marriage-like.”   Id. at 113.  
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was unfair discrimination.
229
  This strategy, in effect, both defined the norms for same sex family 
relationships and encouraged conformity to those norms as the means to attain the community’s 
legal goals.
230
  
The movement to gain legal protection of same-sex family relationships also contributed 
importantly to the transformation of public attitudes about these relationships and ultimately 
about same-sex marriage.  To be sure, changes were not immediate.  Although the AIDS 
epidemic awakened in the gay community a realization of the importance of legal reform, public 
anxiety about AIDS in the 1980s seemed to intensify hostility toward gay and lesbian 
relationships.
231
  But, on our view, collaboration within the community on political and legal 
goals and consensus about the means to achieve them contributed both indirectly and directly to 
public acceptance of same-sex relationships.
232
   The success of the marriage equality movement 
required effective engagement with mainstream society. In part, this happened informally as 
more lesbian and gay couples came out, signaling the quality of their relationships to the straight 
community; in turn, that community became familiar with same-sex couples living together 
(often with their children) in conventional family relationships. Research studies clearly indicate 
that personal association with gay and lesbian individuals as friends, family members, 
colleagues, and neighbors is strongly correlated with positive attitudes and support for marriage 
equality.
233
  Coming out by gays and lesbians dispelled the fears held by many straights: two 
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230
 As William Eskridge explains, the constitutional equal protection framework deployed by legal advocates 
intrinsically has propelled gay activists toward an integrative approach, since it is based on a claim that same-sex 
couples were similarly situated to opposite sex couples, but denied equal treatment. Eskridge, Channelling supra 
note _ at 480.  
231
 A Gallop poll in 1988 found that 57% of respondents thought that sex between same-sex partners should be 
illegal. See Gay and Lesbian Rights, Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx (last visited 
May 7th, 2014).  
232
 To be sure, many advocates in the gay community regret the priority given to attaining marriage rights as well as 
the assimilative strategy adopted to shift public opinion. See Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 
Colum. J. Gender & L. 236, 237-42 (2006) (challenging movement’s focus on marriage)(hereinafter Politics); 
Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask for: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle 
the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage", 79 Va. L. Rev. 1535, 1549 (1993) opposing strategy emphasizing 
similarities between “our relationships and heterosexual marriages.”);  William B. Rubenstein, Divided We Litigate: 
Addressing Disputes Among Group Members and Lawyers in Civil Rights Campaigns, 106 Yale L.J. 1623, 1635 
(1997) (arguing that advocating marriage contrary to the affirmation of gay identity and culture ) . See also 
Ettelbrick, supra note ---. 
233
 Pew Research Center, In Gay Marriage Debate, Both Supporters and Opponents See Legal Recognition as 
Inevitable’, 16 (2013), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/06-06-
13%20LGBT%20General%20Public%20Release.pdf (“68% of those who know a lot of gays and lesbians . . .say 
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adults raising their children in a loving and supportive family was hardly a threatening image. 
The softening of public attitudes, in turn, made it easier for lesbian and gay families to live more 
openly, further reinforcing the trend toward public acceptance.
234
 
The strategies of legal and political advocates and the behavior of gay and lesbian couples 
who became the public face of the marriage equality movement also were critical to the process 
of changing public attitudes. Advocates understood their role as norm entrepreneurs and chose 
their clients carefully;
235
  most petitioners had compelling histories of long-term committed 
relationships.
236
   In various ways, advocates, petitioners and other couples highlighted by the 
media signaled to the larger community the marriage-like quality of same-sex relationships.
237
 
The clear message was that if gays and lesbians were actually allowed to marry, couples that 
chose this option could be expected to conform to stablilizing family norms embraced by the 
larger community. Media reports confirmed that the desire of gay and lesbian partners to 
undertake formal commitment through marriage was motivated by the same sentiments and goals 
as those of straight couples.  As Edie Windsor, who successfully challenged the constitutionality 
of DOMA’s exclusion of same-sex spouses from federal benefits, 238 famously remarked, 
“Marriage is this magic thing. It symbolizes commitment and love like nothing else in the 
world.”239 Eighty -four year old Windsor and the story of her decades-long relationship with 
Thea Spyer became world famous; Time magazine named her a runner-up as the 2013 Person of 
                                                                                                                                                                           
they support same sex marriage.”).  See also PERSILY, CITRON AND EGAN, supra note 102 at 201. Thus it appears 
that coming out by gays dispelled fears held by many straights and reduced animus.  
234
 Pew Research Ctr. A Survey of LGBT Americans, 44 (2013), available at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2013/06/SDT_LGBT-Americans_06-2013.pdf. (92% of LGBTs say society is 
more accepting of them than a decade ago, attributing change to individuals knowing and interacting with LGBT 
persons, the efforts of advocates and to LGBT couples raising families).   
235
 See NeJaime, supra note -- at 88 (describing strategy of emphasizing marriage-like quality of gay relationships as 
contrasted with unmarried straight couples). 
236
 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Gay Marriage at the Supreme Court: A ‘Real Couple’ Behind Prop 8 Challenge, 
Washington Post (March 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gay-marriage-at-the-supreme-court-a-
real-couple-behind-prop-8-challenge/2013/03/09/39dd12f0-869e-11e2-98a3-b3db6b9ac586_story.html (discussing 
relationship of couple in California Proposition 8). 
237
 Id. Attractive and non-threatening couples petitioning for legal equality, registering for civil unions and applying 
for marriage licenses came to represent all lesbian and gay families subject to legal discrimination. Katherine M. 
Franke, Politics, supra note _.  
238
 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). The Court struck down DOMA’s § 3, which limited the 
applications of provisions under federal law relating to marriage to marriages of different-sex couples. Windsor, 133 
S. Ct. at 2695–96. 
239
 Nina Totenberg, Meet The 83-Year-Old Taking On The U.S. Over Same-Sex Marriage, NPR, (March 21 , 2013) 
http://www.npr.org/2013/03/21/174944430/meet-the-83-year-old-taking-on-the-u-s-over-same-sex-marriage. 
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the Year.
240
 On our view, the success of the marriage equality movement owes a great deal to the 
impact on public and lawmakers’ opinion of the stories of petitioners such as Windsor, without 
which it is unclear whether the powerful legal arguments made on their behalf would have 
succeeded.
241
  
 This account of the gay and lesbian movement to attain marriage rights tracks the 
evolutionary process from isolation to integration described in Part II.  Couples and their 
advocates collaborated in forming normative communities with the common aim of gaining 
social recognition and legal protection of gay and lesbian families, and these networks reinforced 
and supported their family relationships. Partly through the strategies of advocates, same-sex 
couples signaled effectively to the larger community that they lived in conventional, marriage-
like relationships, caring for each other and for their children. This process has led to a dramatic 
shift in public attitudes; by 2013, a majority of Americans approved of marriage rights for same-
sex couples.
242
  In many parts of the country, the social status of committed same-sex couples 
has evolved in a generation from that of isolated outsiders or even outlaws to families who are 
integrated into the broader normative community.  
3.  Incremental Progress toward Legal Recognition 
Although the stages of the collaborative process we describe in Part II are usefully 
separated for analytic purposes, we would expect the networking-social-acceptance stage and the 
legal-recognition stage to overlap substantially; this overlap has certainly characterized the 
marriage equality movement. As we have explained, the realization that same-sex unions were 
legally vulnerable directly led to the creation and strengthening of LGBT networks. Moreover, 
signaling the marriage-like qualities of same-sex family relationships which contributed to social 
acceptance was partly a legal strategy; the evidence suggests that this signaling furthered legal 
                                                     
240
 Eliza Gray, Edith Windsor, the Unlikely Activist, Time (Dec. 11, 2013) http://poy.time.com/2013/12/11/runner-
up-edith-windsor-the-unlikely-activist,  supra note _;  see also Adam Gabbatt, Edith Windsor and Thea Spyer: 'A 
Love Affair That Just Kept On And On And On', (June 26, 2013), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/26/edith-windsor-thea-spyer-doma (describing relationship).  
241
 Roberta Kaplan, attorney for Edie Windsor, described the importance of Windsor’s personal story to the success 
of the constitutional litigation. Columbia Law School Commencement address, May 22, 2014 (on file with the 
authors). 
242
 See Lydia Saad, In U.S., 52% Back Law to Legalize Gay Marriage in 50 States, at 
http://www.gallop.com/poll/163730/back-law-legalize-marriage-states.aspx _(Gallop poll showing majority support 
for marriage rights). 
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claims and reassured lawmakers as well as influencing public opinion.
243
  Finally, the extension 
of legal protections has had a powerful expressive effect, legitimating gay relationships and 
reinforcing positive public attitudes.
244
 In the past decade, of course, the dynamic synergy 
between evolving public attitudes and legal reform has been extraordinary.
245
  
Incremental progress toward full legal recognition of same-sex couples’ family 
relationships began in the late 1980s and continues today. In the early period, LGBT legal 
advocates enjoyed limited successes; a few courts recognized gay or lesbian couples as de facto 
families for particular purposes,
246
 and cities such as New York and San Francisco allowed gay 
and lesbian couples (and sometimes others) to register as domestic partners, a status that carried 
symbolic meaning but few benefits.
247
  In the mid and late 1990s, a handful of state legislatures 
enacted laws creating registration systems that conferred a somewhat broader array of rights and 
benefits.
248
  Following the Vermont Supreme Court opinion in Baker v State in 1999, several 
states enacted civil union statutes allowing same-sex couples to register for a status that closely 
mirrored marriage in its tangible benefits and obligations, but lacked its respected status.
249
 In 
2003, the Supreme Court held anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional in Lawrence v. Texas, 
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 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (discussing the “aspects of married and family life” 
embodied in many same-sex relationships). See discussion supra Part IIA2.  
244
 Text accompanying note  _.    
245
 The views of lawmakers changed in response to public opinion, of course, but also sometimes as a result of 
personal experience. See Richard Socarides, Rob Portman and His Brave, Gay Son, The New Yorker (March 15, 
2013), http:// www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/03/rob-portman-and-his-brave-gay-
son.html#ixzz2Nhz4rUQK (noting Senator Rob Portman changed his mind in favor of same-sex marriage after his 
son came out); Robin Toner, Cheney Stakes Out His Own Position on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, 
at A1 (describing Dick Cheney’s shift in opinion on marriage equality after acknowledging sexuality of his lesbian 
daughter). 
246
 See Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 55 (holding gay couple to be de facto family); E.N.O. v. L.M.M. 711 N.E.2d 886, 
893–94 (1999) (holding lesbian partner to be de facto parent).   
247
 See NeJaime, supra note -- (describing efforts to enact domestic partnership ordinances in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco). See also Raymond C. O'Brien, Domestic Partnership: Recognition and Responsibility, 32 San Diego L. 
Rev. 163, 184 (1995) (describing New York City ordinance extending “health benefits to both homosexual and 
heterosexual domestic partners.”). Different-sex couples were allowed to register under some domestic partnership 
ordinances, but the purpose was to extend some recognition to gay and lesbian couples.  
248
 Hawaii created a limited “reciprocal beneficiary” status in 1997. See note __ infra.  See also In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 413 (Ca. 2008) (describing 1999 California legislation a statewide domestic partnership 
registry.) 
249
 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (ban on same sex marriage violated Common Benefits clause of state constitution). In 
1993, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that state’s prohibition of same-sex marriage to be sex discrimination under 
state constitution. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P2d 44 (Haw. 1993). In response, the state constitution was amended. 
Vermont responded to Baker by enacting a comprehensive civil union statute, as did several other states over the 
next decade. Misha Isaak, "What's in A Name?:"  Civil Unions and the Constitutional Significance of "Marriage", 
10 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 607, 642 (2008) (describing states enactment of civil unions and  domestic partnerships, with 
many, but not all, of the rights of marriage).  
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removing a major obstacle to safe family formation for same-sex couples.
250
 Thereafter, 
beginning in 2003 with the Massachusetts case of Goodrich v. Department of Public Health, 
courts and then legislatures have extended the right to marry to same sex couples.
251
 Today 
nineteen states recognize this right.
252
   
This account is familiar and need not be repeated in detail. For our purposes, three 
aspects of the regulatory history are important.  First, as predicted in the model set out in Part II, 
the process was iterative, allowing lawmakers to gain information incrementally about the 
functioning of same-sex unions to determine whether these groups provided the stability and 
capacity to fulfill family functions. In this way, lawmakers were able to meet the challenge of 
verifying that an aspiring family group that had been the target of hostility and disparagement 
deserved legal protection. Courts and legislatures evaluated the claim by marriage opponents that 
children raised by gay and lesbian parents faced harms not experienced by children raised by 
married parents—and therefore, these couples lacked the qualities to function adequately as 
families.
253
  Evidence of same sex couples raising their children satisfactorily accumulated over 
time, along with scientific studies indicating that the opponents’ claim was groundless.254 This 
information greatly weakened the argument against extending the right to marry to gay and 
lesbian couples since few disputed that, in the absence of particular harm, children benefited if 
their parents were able to enjoy the benefits of marriage.
255
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 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, N.E.2d 941, 957 (Mass. 2003) (finding a right to marriage by same sex 
couples in state). In 2014, 19 states recognize full marriage equality for gay couples. Marriage Equality U.S.A., 
National Map, at www.marriageequality.org/current-status, visited June 13, 2014.  
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 This number is updated as of August 1, 2014. Gay Marriage : Pro and Con, at 
http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=004857 
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 This ubiquitous claim was made recently in the briefs of the state of Utah appealing a District Court’s holding 
that its statute restricting marriage to different sex couples is unconstitutional. See Brief for Appellants, Kitchen v. 
Herbert, 2013 WL 7175328 (D.Utah) (“[M]an-woman marriage promotes the State's compelling interest in the care 
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rearing”).     
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 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (evaluating and rejecting claims 
by plaintiffs that “children raised by their married, biological parents do better on average than children raised in 
other environments.”). See also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, N.E.2d 941, 957 (Mass. 2003)(rejecting state’s 
claim that children raised by gay parents suffered harm). 
255
 For example, David Blankenhorn, the advocate who argued in Perry, id., that children were harmed by same-sex 
parents, abandoned his position in 2012 (on the ground that children benefited from the stability of marriage).  Ethan 
Bronner, Gay Marriage Gains Backer as Major Foe Revises Views, N.Y. Times (June 22, 2012) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/us/david-blankenhorn-drops-opposition-to-gay-marriage.html.  
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The second key feature of the process by which legal rights were extended to gay couples 
suggests another way in which regulators and advocates collaborated to produce the information 
necessary to evaluate this group of aspiring families. From the beginning, even when the rights 
sought and conferred were meager, marriage has provided the template of best practices against 
which both advocates and regulators have measured same-sex relationships. As Douglas 
NeJaime demonstrates in his interesting study of LGBT advocacy in California in the 1980s and 
1990s, advocates and couples argued consistently in different legal settings that same-sex unions 
were marriage-equivalent and different from the casual affiliations of heterosexual couples who 
chose not to marry.
256
 Moreover, lawmakers required, as a condition of even limited legal 
recognition, that qualifying relationships be marriage-like. Under California domestic 
partnership ordinances and statutes, for example, domestic partners were defined as two 
individuals, not related by blood or marriage that “share the common necessaries of life,”257 and 
“declare that they are each other’s principal domestic partner.”258  As NeJaime points out, the 
language reflected an effort to define the responsibilities and commitment of domestic partners 
as equivalent to those of marriage.
259
  
 Two important purposes were served by defining domestic partnerships as marriage-
equivalent. First, domestic partnership status provided same-sex couples with another and clearer 
means of signaling the quality of their relationships, expediting the process of public acceptance. 
Registration as domestic partners may have carried few tangible benefits, but the act announced 
to the world that couples were in a committed interdependent relationship. Second, domestic 
partnership and civil union registration have some similarity to the collaborative “best practices” 
process described in Part II: The aspiring couples provided information to the state about how 
they planned to fulfill their family functions, the parties collectively established benchmarks that 
embodied their expectations for the support and care of family members, and lawmakers could 
use domestic partnership registration by same-sex couples to monitor compliance with 
advocates’ claims that many gay couples lived in marriage-like unions.260  
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 See NeJaime, supra note_ at 114-116.  
257
 This language was based on California case law defining marital obligations.  Id. at 119.   
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 San Francisco Dom Ord., id. at 130.  
259
  Id. at 131. 
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Thus, for example, if most domestic partnerships failed, advocates claims about the nature of these unions would 
have been weakened.  
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The third aspect of the process of legal reform that merits attention is the extent to which 
lawmakers have conferred legal protection of same-sex relationships through registration and 
licensing, rather than through judicial recognition of informal unions.  Although de facto parents 
have had some success in obtaining visitation rights in custody disputes, only rarely in the past 
decade have courts and legislatures conferred rights and obligations on same-sex couples living 
in informal unions. The ALI Domestic Partnership Principles, under which couples living in 
informal unions are subject to the inter se rights and duties of marriage, has gained little 
traction.
261
 Given the momentum toward greater legal protection of same-sex relationships, this 
may seem surprising. But as we suggested in Part II, a licensing approach has many advantages. 
Registration is an efficient and privacy-protective mechanism for resolving the daunting 
verifiability problems faced by lawmakers aiming to offer family benefits only to those groups 
that fulfill family functions.  By allowing couples to signal that their relationship is based on 
mutual commitment and responsibility, registration assists regulators in distinguishing unions 
that warrant legal protection from more casual affiliations without costly probing inquiries.   
B. THE INCOMPLETE RECOGNITION OF COHABITATION RELATIONSHIPS 
Although LGBT advocates have enjoyed considerable success in attaining legal 
recognition of same-sex family relationships, informally cohabiting couples in this country have 
received few legal protections.
262
  Public hostility or ignorance about cohabitation cannot explain 
the failure of lawmakers to confer legal protection on cohabitants; surveys indicate substantial 
tolerance of informal unions.
263
 Yet many couples live together in marriage-like relationships 
with few of the state benefits associated with marriage and without the obligations to one another 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Of course not all aspiring families are modeled on marriage. This suggests that some novel family groups may face 
different challenges as they seek legal recognition and that regulators’ may also need to adopt different verification 
strategies to evaluate these groups. We address this issue below in Part IIIC. 
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 See Wilson & Chilham, supra note 183(reporting that no state has adopted ALI domestic partnership status). See 
note _ supra (discussing ALI Domestic Partners’ rights and obligations).  
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 For a discussion of the very limited legal protections enjoyed by unmarried couples, see ELLMAN, ET. AL, supra 
note _ at 967-73. For critiques and proposals for reform, see NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) 
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Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1381, 1382-85 (2001)(describing the absence of rights 
and obligations between cohabitants); Cherlin, supra note -- at 292-94 (proposing greater legal protection for 
cohabiting parents); Weiner, supra note – at 160 (arguing for increased rights and obligations between unmarried 
parents.   
As Polikoff has noted, unmarried couples in Canada, and other countries have been more successful in attaining 
legal protections. CITE  
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 See Pew Research Center, The Decline of Marriage, supra note_ (finding a majority of public either neutral or 
positive about cohabitation (including unmarried couples raising children)).  
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that protect spouses on divorce. Our analysis in Part I suggests that a liberal society should 
confer legal protection on all groups that fulfill family functions satisfactorily. Why then have 
same sex couples been so successful in attaining the legal benefits awarded to families while 
cohabitants have largely been left unprotected?  
Our analysis of the impediments facing aspiring families and the means of overcoming 
these obstacles through collaboration sheds light on this puzzle. Two interrelated features of 
cohabitation have impeded progress toward legal recognition and left cohabitants with few of the 
legal rights and duties conferred on protected families. First, the category of cohabitants includes 
a broad range of couples with varying intentions for their relationships. Some cohabiting 
relationships are based on enduring commitment and interdependence; for psychological or 
ideological reasons, these couples have chosen not to enter legal marriage.
264
  Other couples are 
experimental and tentative in their commitment; they may or may not develop into long-term 
family relationships. Still other cohabitants affirmatively reject commitment and financial 
interdependence: Indeed, this is a significant reason not to marry.
265
  Of course, this variability 
might describe gay and lesbian unions as well. But the difference, emphasized by LGBT 
advocates, is the second feature of cohabitation that has complicated the path to family 
recognition.  The decision not to marry when marriage is an option sends a confusing signal 
about the nature of cohabitants’ relationships, and the extent to which they are defined by family 
commitment norms. This uncertainty impedes the sorting of those informal unions that serve 
family functions adequately from more casual relationships that do not. The uncertain signal 
created by the choice not to marry, together with the variability among cohabiting couples, has 
hindered network formation and normative integration; it also poses challenging verifiability 
problems for regulators. In short, the defining features of cohabitation as a category create the 
uncertainty that has inhibited progress toward legal recognition.  
1. Cohabitation and Norm Creation: Networking and Integration 
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 Contractual claims for property and support are often brought by parties whose informal union was marriage-like. 
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 Id. See Judith Seltzer, Families Formed Outside of Marriage, 62 J. Marriage & Fam. 1247 (2000) (finding 
differences between cohabitants and spouses).  
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Researchers have found that cohabitants have lower levels of commitment to their 
relationships than do married couples;
266
 perhaps for this reason, informal unions typically are 
far less stable than marriages.  This is partly due, of course, to the diversity among cohabiting 
couples described above. For many couples, cohabitation is experimental, a way for each 
cohabitant to evaluate whether the relationship is viable and the other party a trustworthy and 
compatible life partner. Thus, within three years, most informal unions either end or transition to 
marriage.
 267
  Like same-sex couples, some different-sex couples may deal with the uncertainty 
of their relationships by entering into collaborative contracts in the early experimental phase.  
But as other scholars have noted, cohabiting couples infrequently execute formal contracts 
regarding property sharing and future support: plausibly this is because many couples who 
collaborate successfully see marriage as a superior option to formal contracting.
268
  
Unlike the pattern observed among same-sex couples, there is little evidence that 
cohabiting couples generally affiliate in normative communities that support and reinforce their 
family relationships.  This also is likely due to the variations among cohabitant relationships.  
Couples who eschew commitment likely have little in common with those in long term marriage-
like unions (who indeed may present to the community as married couples).
269
 Moreover, social 
class plays a role in cohabitation patterns, with poor and less educated couples being more likely 
to dissolve their relationships and less likely to marry before having children than those who are 
more educated.
270
  This diversity likely deters the development of collaborative networks that 
reinforce behavioral expectations promoting care and interdependence. Stephen Nock has argued 
that, in contrast to marriage, cohabitation is “under-institutionalized,” lacking a strong set of 
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stabilizing social norms.
271
 Consistent expectations for cohabitants’ behavior or goals would fit 
poorly with the broad range of relationships in the category.  
Nor do we find evidence that groups of cohabitants or their advocates collaborate to 
further their common interest in attaining legal protection. Cohabitants experience most of the 
legal disadvantages that same-sex couples have suffered: they are excluded from government 
benefits conferred on married couples and other legal protections; moreover, absent contract, the 
parties have few obligations to one another.
272
  Yet the response to these exclusions has been 
relatively passive.  To be sure, advocates for poor families, that include many cohabitants and 
their children, seek generally to better lives strained by poverty. But these efforts focus largely 
on improving child welfare and not directly on extending legal recognition to cohabitants.
273
  We 
find no evidence of network formation  aimed at extending legal protection to cohabitation as a 
family category. Perhaps this is because the vulnerability of non-marital unions can easily be 
remedied by marriage.  Straight couples likely sometimes marry to avoid the frustration and 
harms of non-marital status, even if their preference might be to continue to cohabitate. Those 
cohabitants who do not marry must solve a difficult collective action problem if they are to 
pursue legal recognition and protection of their non-marital families.  
The process of normative integration into the larger community also has not proceeded in 
a way that would position cohabitants to attain legal protection. The LGBT drive to attain family 
rights was instrumental in fostering normative integration of same sex couples into the broader 
community and in shaping public attitudes about the character of their family relationships. 
Cohabitants are not subject to the hostility that same-sex couples endured; thus in some sense 
informal families already enjoy public acceptance.  But this does not translate into public support 
for elevating cohabitants to the status of fully protected legal families. This is not surprising 
since cohabitants have not signaled their commitment to family functioning norms. Instead, the 
wide range of cohabiting relationships means that the signals are noisy:  couples in casual or 
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tentative relationships do not signal long term commitment while many couples in durable and 
committed unions often do not announce their unmarried status at all.
274
 
2. Cohabitation and the Verifiability Problem    
Even if cohabitants formed networks to advocate for legal recognition of their families, 
regulators would face difficulty in verifying cohabitation as a family category. The broad range 
of cohabitants includes many couples that lack the qualities of well-functioning families but who 
may seek family status with its benefits and privileges.  Co-residency in an intimate union is 
unlikely by itself to serve as an adequate basis for designating informal dyads as families, and 
sorting couples in committed relationships from less deserving types poses a challenge for 
regulators.  Because informal unions lack the clear commitment signal provided by 
registration,
275
 accurate determination of family status requires a costly factual inquiry that 
threatens privacy
276
 and is prone to error. Courts have occasionally been willing to make these 
determinations but typically it has been in situations where simpler mechanisms for signaling 
family status are unavailable.
277
  As the lukewarm response to the ALI Domestic Partnership 
Principles demonstrates, state actors resort only reluctantly to this ex post approach to 
determining family status.
278
 
Some cohabiting couples are clearly in family relationships, and regulators may be able 
to employ a few straightforward proxies to minimize verifiability problems.  For example, 
biological parenthood could serve as a basis for creating family bonds between cohabiting 
parents.  Currently, unmarried parents living together have no financial or other duties to one 
another, although both parents have substantial obligations to their children. The combination of 
shared parenthood and cohabitation could function as a verifiable proxy subjecting the couple to 
family obligations and entitling them to the benefits that legal families enjoy.
279
 Cohabitants can 
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also be classified on the basis of the duration of their unions. Most cohabiting couples separate or 
marry in a few years: a couple who live together for five years or more can be assumed to be in a 
marriage-like relationship, with the attendant rights and duties, unless they opt out contractually 
from family obligations.
280
 Well-designed proxies such as these would allow regulators to sort 
cohabitants in family relationships from those whose commitment (and social value) is less 
compelling. 
C.  NON-DYADIC NOVEL FAMILIES: NAVIGATING NEW TERRITORY 
Both same- and different-sex cohabiting couples are in intimate dyadic relationships, and 
have been measured against a template based on marriage.  For same-sex relationships, this 
familiar model has simplified and facilitated normative integration and, ultimately, verification 
by regulators of the qualities of couples aspiring to gain legal protection.  Other aspiring 
families, however, may lack ready models of family behavior to provide them with normative 
guidelines or to assist others in evaluating their functioning. Polygamous, multi-generational, and 
voluntary kin groups may all function as viable families, but to some extent they are pioneers 
adapting behavior and structuring family obligations to suit their unique forms. To be sure, some 
such families --such as multi-generational relationships—are familiar, but they have thus far 
functioned informally without the goal of full legal protection.
281
 In general, these novel families 
face the initial task of structuring their family relationships through experimentation and 
adaptation without the template that marriage provides.   
These groups are characterized by one of two features—some by both—that distinguish 
them from families modeled on marriage. The first is that they often include more than two adult 
parties.
282
 A group that includes multiple adults is more complex than a dyad in ways that 
generate uncertainty about its functioning.  Avoiding exploitation, imposing obligations fairly 
and efficiently and protecting the interests of those adults who dissent from decisions by the 
                                                     
280
 See Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation, and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004 U. Chi. L. Forum 225  
(arguing that couples who have cohabited for five years typically are in marriage-like relationships and should be 
subject to default rules regulating property sharing and support on divorce.)  
281
 Grandparents in the 1980s and 90s did lobby successfully for the enactment of grandparent visitation statutes. See 
discussion in ELLMAN ET. AL., supra note _ at 732-33. But see Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (application 
of Wash. grandparent visitation statute violate parents’ constitutional rights).   See also Moore v City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (rejecting zoning ordinance that had the effect of excluding grandparent raising her 
grandchild from definition of “family”).  
282
 A multigenerational or voluntary kin family could include just two adults but many will include more. For 
simplicity, we do not deal specifically with dyads. 
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adult majority require more complex mechanisms than is required to regulate an equalitarian 
dyad.
283
  Second, while polygamous relationships involve sexual intimacy, other aspiring unions 
are not based on conjugal bonds among the adults. The combination of multiple parties and 
asexual relationships creates uncertainties about the stability and functioning of these novel 
families that are different from, and possibly greater than, those families based on the model of 
marriage. For multi-generational groups, of course, this uncertainty may be offset by genetic ties 
and by historic tradition. But other non-dyadic groups may greater challenges in demonstrating 
their viability as stable families.  
1. Polygamous Groups 
In the current climate, it may seem fanciful to discuss the path to legal recognition for 
polygamous family aspirants. In contemporary American society, polygamy is largely associated 
with fundamentalist Mormon communities and other notorious cultlike groups that are generally 
viewed with hostility for posing a severe risk to teenage girls who reportedly are coerced into 
sexual relationships with older men.
284
 On this ground, fundamentalist Mormons have been 
subject to child protection interventions and their leaders have faced criminal prosecution.
285
 
These groups are deeply hierarchical, with women occupying subservient positions in a male-
dominated oligarchy-- a family structure that is discordant with contemporary norms of gender 
equality.
286
 Finally, because outlaw polygamous groups include a small number of (usually 
older) men with many wives, young men are often expelled from their communities.
287
  It is fair 
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to say that polygamous families are unlikely to attain public acceptance or legal recognition so 
long as fundamentalist religious polygamists represent the archetypical model.  
But attitudes toward polygamy appear to be softening somewhat, as evidenced by the 
popularity of the television series, Big Love, and the reality show, Sister Wives, both depicting 
rather conventional polygamous families.
288
 Further, the legal basis for prohibiting polygamous 
families may be eroding.  In 2013, in a case involving the family depicted in Sister Wives, a Utah 
federal district court held unconstitutional a state criminal ban on polygamy.
289
  As the court in 
Brown v, Buhman pointed out, fundamentalist Mormon men practicing polygamy typically enter 
multiple religious marriages but have only one legal wife.  On this basis, the court applied 
Lawrence v. Texas to hold that the prong of the Utah bigamy statute prohibiting cohabitation by 
a legally married person violated the individuals’ right of privacy protected under the 14th 
Amendment.
290
  Further, the court found that the Utah law interfered with the free exercise of 
religion in targeting a particular group.  None of this indicates that polygamy has gained public 
acceptance but it does suggest some change in public attitudes and a movement toward 
decriminalization, an essential step in the process leading to legal recognition.
291
  
Although some polyamorous groups may value the fluidity and liberty that parties in 
unregulated relationships enjoy,
292
 others (such as the hypothetical polygamous family we 
describe) might aspire to relationships based on commitment and interdependence.
293
  For those 
in the latter category, family status may be a desirable goal, made more plausible by the success 
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of the LGBT marriage equality movement.
294
 Aspiring polygamous families confront two 
challenges, one common to multi-party adult relationships generally and the other familiar from 
the LGBT experience. Like other families with multiple adults, polygamous groups aiming for 
recognition must create governance structures that promote stability, while ensuring a fair 
distribution of rights and obligations, without the guidance provided by the dyadic model of 
marriage. In addition, like same-sex couples, polygamous groups face the formidable challenge 
of moving from outlaw status to integration into the broader normative community. Moreover, 
aspiring polygamous families must overcome a challenge not confronted by gays and lesbians—
the reputational harm created by the actual practices of fundamentalist polygamists.
295
 
The first challenge for aspiring polygamous families is to create a collaborative 
agreement sufficient to overcome high levels of uncertainty about the viability of this 
relationship form.  Multi-party contracting requires more complex governance structures than 
does bilateral agreement.
296
  In addition to the challenge of specifying mutual obligations and 
responsibilities, parties must structure their relationships and performance to avoid exploitation 
of all members and also address the key question of how to resolve disagreements.
297
  Adrienne 
Davis has suggested that this challenge can be met by adapting the default rules governing 
partnership relationships.
298
 These rules protect dissenting members from exploitation by the 
majority and permit exit from the partnership by dissenting minorities under specified 
conditions.
299
   In addition, the parties can contract for a unanimity rule governing all family 
decision-making.  Here the threat of dissolution of the relationship should the parties fail to agree 
on a course of action deters frivolous disagreements and encourages compromise.  Under this  
regime, parties are able to learn rather quickly whether their partners are capable of adequate 
family functioning and whether they have the capacity for collaborative decision-making.  Such 
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an environment has been shown to create bonds of trust in commercial relationships based on 
similar collaborative structures.  The success of multi-party professional partnerships and other 
commercial collaborations suggests that there are available models to solve the contracting 
problems facing polygamous groups who wish to test the durability of their relationship through 
contract.  
But even if individual polygamous relationships can be sustained through collaborative 
and formal contracting, these groups face a daunting task seeking to move from outlaw status to 
integration with the larger normative community.  Just as same sex intimacy was criminalized in 
the pre-Lawrence era, (at least some) polygamous unions are often prohibited under criminal 
law.
300
 For this reason, polygamous groups are likely to be secretive; as with same-sex couples, 
this inhibits the formation of normative networks and, ultimately, acceptance by the broader 
social community.  Moreover, a powerful strategy deployed by LGBT advocates for gaining 
public acceptance and legal reform, the identification of same sex unions with marriage, is likely 
not available to polygamous groups. Further, stable commitment may seem to be incompatible 
with the simultaneous maintenance of multiple intimate relationships; if so, polygamous 
relationships may be perceived as offending the strong social norm against adultery.  
But polygamists have been heartened by the LGBT movement, the success of which may 
function as a catalyst that emboldens polygamist groups to live more openly and to pursue legal 
recognition of their family relationships.
301
 If these groups function as stable, caring units in 
which adult members relate to one another on the basis of equality and minors are not exploited, 
polygamous families plausibly can signal to the larger community that they are committed to 
family functioning norms. As with the LGBT marriage equality movement, a key element of this 
process is the formation of networks of aspiring families and their advocates. Effective legal and 
social advocacy by norm entrepreneurs on behalf of contemporary polygamous groups might 
gradually supplant religious polygamists in the public imagination.  Indeed, the process of 
network formation has begun, facilitated by the internet, with the emergence of interest groups 
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whose goal is promote interaction among polygamists, disseminate information to correct 
negative impressions and ultimately acquire plural marriage rights. The web site of one such 
group announces that “[f]reely-consenting, adult, non-abusive, marriage-committed polygamy is 
the next civil rights battle.” 302 
Polygamists face particularly daunting challenges in attaining state certification.  Because 
the form is not modeled on the familiar marital dyad and because of the sordid and familiar 
recent history of polygamy, the state will require extraordinary assurances that these new 
families are different from fundamentalist cults. Because of these unique obstacles, transparency 
and cooperation with regulators will likely be essential. The model developed in Part II predicts 
that an iterative process of collaboration to develop and enforce best practices offers the most 
plausible path for polygamists to attain family status.  To be sure, the goal of attaining marriage 
rights for polygamists may currently seem unlikely, but Buhman and other recent developments 
hint that the legal prohibition of and moral distaste for multi-party intimate unions is beginning 
to erode.  If so, polygamous groups may well be in the early stages of the evolutionary process 
that leads to legal recognition.
303
 
2. Non-Conjugal Aspiring Families 
Aspiring non-conjugal families includes groups that are truly contemporary and those 
that are quite familiar; both confront unique challenges in attaining legal recognition. Some 
aspiring families, such as voluntary kin groups, have only recently attracted public interest and 
attention.
304
 Others, such as multi-generational families, have deep roots in American society and 
have been recognized by the Supreme Court as having constitutionally protected family status 
for some purposes.
305
  Non-conjugal groups have some advantages as aspiring families. They 
avoid the destabilizing risk of infidelity and, because their non-sexual bonds do not incite moral 
disapproval, they are unlikely to stir public opprobrium. In this regard, the process toward legal 
recognition may be smoother than that of same-sex couples or polygamous groups. But 
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paradoxically, the absence of conjugal ties may generate skepticism about the durability and 
stability of some non-conjugal affiliations.  Because the legal family has long been modeled on 
marriage, non-conjugal groups may need to overcome an implicit assumption that a sexual bond 
reinforces family commitment between unrelated adults. Moreover, like polygamous groups, 
multi-member non-conjugal family aspirants need to create governance structures that promote 
commitment and avoid exploitation. Finally, some non-conjugal relationships (particularly 
voluntary kin) fill important family functions, but the parties themselves do not expect the group 
to satisfy the full range of dependency needs.
306
  In short, the evolutionary process whereby these 
groups might acquire legal protection remains unclear.  
a. Multigenerational groups.  These obstacles may be least likely to impede legal 
recognition of multi-generational families. Extended families have the benefit of both deep 
historic roots and genetic bonds, ties that are assumed to form a solid basis of family 
commitment. Indeed, until the 20
th
 century, when the two-parent nuclear family became the 
norm, multi-generational families predominated.
307
 The Supreme Court, in an opinion rejecting 
the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that prohibited a grandson from living in his 
grandmother’s home, famously noted that extended families have played an important role in 
American society for centuries.
308
  But despite the fact that multi-generational families are 
recognized for some limited legal purposes,
309
 and generally are regarded favorably in the public 
imagination, for the most part these families function informally and do not receive the legal 
protection of marital families.  
In part, this may be due to the complexity of extended families and uncertainty about 
which genetic family members are, or should be, recognized as a legal family. A family with 
multiple adults of different generations may include some who are eager to assume durable 
family obligations in an extended family unit and others whose affiliations are more attenuated, 
and who may prefer to form smaller units with non-family partners.  Some members may reside 
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with the group for a period and then depart.  If legal recognition is justified for multi-
generational groups with stable long-term commitments to provide mutual care, the state will 
require a sorting mechanism –beyond genetic ties – to separate those members that fulfill family 
functioning needs from those that lack either the willingness or the capability (or both) to fulfill 
the familial role. 
Probably the strongest candidate for full family status is the linear family group 
composed of grandparent(s), parent(s) and child(ren).  It is clear that this familiar type of 
extended family can function satisfactorily to fulfill family functions.  Further, the genetic bond 
among the members, together with well-defined family roles, reinforces already existing norms 
of commitment and caring.   The primary challenge for these extended families may be the 
creation of networks with other similar families to pursue their goals of increasing public support 
and attaining official family status.
310
  More complex multigenerational groups pose a greater 
challenge because they are less familiar to the public and less likely to be bound by family 
commitment norms than are linear family groups. Partly for this reason, regulators may find it 
more difficult to verify the family functioning of these non-conventional multi-generational 
groups.  
b. Voluntary kin groups.  Voluntary kin groups have recently received media attention, 
but generally they are relatively unfamiliar to the public and to regulators.
311
  In part, their 
emergence can be explained as a product of deficits in the functioning of more traditional family 
forms with the increase in divorce and decline of extended families in recent decades. Thus, 
some groups of voluntary kin function as substitutes for marriage or other family relationships. 
Lacking genetic or legal ties, members assume certain family roles and insist that their 
relationships are not simply friendships.
312
  These groups can take many forms: variations 
include two or more divorced or widowed adults, sometimes with their minor children; a parent 
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who has lost an adult child and a younger adult who has assumed that role;
313
 and adult friends 
who decide to live together, share resources and care for one another in a non-conjugal group.
314
 
The latter affiliation may include retired seniors who decide to live together for mutual 
companionship and support.
315
   
In one sense, the path to legal recognition might be less difficult for these aspiring 
families than for gay couples or polygamous groups because voluntary kin are less likely to face 
public enmity. Moreover, in contrast to some relationships based on sexual intimacy, these non-
conjugal groups are formed specifically (and solely) for the purpose of fulfilling family 
functions.
316
  But voluntary kin groups have many varying goals and expectations about their 
family roles. While some live as committed interdependent families, researchers report that in 
many relationships the voluntary kin do not purport (or aspire) to satisfy the full range of family 
functions.
317
 Sometimes the relationship is viewed as a supplement to other primary family 
relationships. For example, lesbian parents may have a relationship with their child’s biological 
father who plays an important role in the child’s life but does not assume other family 
obligations.
318
  As with cohabiting couples, this variety predictably can impede the formation of 
networks based on common interests and complicate the ability to signal the family-like nature 
of the category.  Of course, unlike cohabitants, committed voluntary kin cannot marry and thus 
groups that do function fully as families predictably can signal their nature more effectively than 
can cohabitants.  
One issue raised by the possibility of assigning family status to voluntary kin and other 
multi-adult family groups is whether the size of these groups is self-limiting. As we have 
suggested, increasing the number of adults adds complexity and costs to family relationships, 
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along with the risk of exploitation, shirking, and other potential harms.
319
 These risks may tend 
to increase as members are added, with the result that only multi-party groups with relatively few 
members are likely to function effectively in fulfilling family functions.  Limitations on the size 
of aspiring families that are able to qualify for legal recognition forestall the possibility that 
communes or cult groups might register as a voluntary kinship family.    
A final important question that we note but do not fully address is raised by the 
heterogeneity of voluntary kin groups (and some multi-generational families), with many 
fulfilling a limited range of family functions. Here the question is whether these limited purpose 
relationships are likely to acquire legal recognition through the evolutionary process we describe. 
To be sure, many individuals in voluntary kin relationships, like some cohabitants, prefer to 
maintain informal ties.  But others may desire legal enforcement of the particular rights and 
obligations that they have assumed and seek protection of those family bonds.
320
  Suggestive 
evidence of groups attaining limited family rights supports the plausibility of this outcome 
through some variation of the process we describe.  For example, grandparents have lobbied 
successfully (with the assistance of AARP, a powerful interest group) to enact statutes that give 
them standing to seek visitation with their grandchildren.
321
 Moreover, at least one state has 
enacted a statute that allows couples to customize their family relationships by executing 
“designated beneficiary” agreements in which each party chooses to extend particular rights and 
protections to the other from a menu of options.
322
  It may be that the path to legal protection of 
more limited family relationships raises fewer or different challenges than those faced by groups 
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who aim to gain social and legal recognition as fully functioning families.  But, in any event, that 
analysis is beyond the scope of our project. 
 
 
                            CONCLUSION 
The past decade has witnessed a dramatic change in public attitudes and legal status for 
same-sex couples who wish to marry.  These events demonstrate that the legal conception of the 
family is no longer limited to traditional marriage.  At the same time, the lack of substantial 
movement toward granting legal benefits to unmarried cohabitants is evidence that the state 
remains committed to a welfarist criterion for granting legal status, one that embodies a 
commitment to family functioning norms; as a category, cohabitants are too diverse to satisfy 
this critereon.  Viewed together, both of these developments suggest that other groups aspiring to 
legal recognition as families must overcome substantial uncertainties if they are to achieve their 
ultimate objectives.  At the core, overcoming these uncertainties requires establishing trust at 
every level — among the individual members of the aspiring family group, among the individual 
group and other similar aspirants, and among the network of aspiring families, the larger social 
community and the state. Collaborative processes have been shown in other settings to offer a 
means for creating trust endogenously and thus appear to offer a way forward in the evolution of 
other novel families.  Moreover, collaboration was a crucial element in the successful movement 
to achieve marriage rights for LBGT couples, and the absence of meaningful collaboration is one 
factor in explaining the stasis that characterizes the status of unmarried cohabitants.  This, then, 
is the evidence supporting the prediction that the future progress of other aspiring family groups 
toward legal status will depend in large part on how well they are able to engage the 
collaborative mechanisms that smooth the path from contract to status. 
  
      
